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Contested director elections are a central feature of the corporate 
landscape and underlie shareholder activism. Rules governing proxy voting by 
shareholders prevent shareholders from “mixing and matching” among 
nominees from the two sides of contests. This Article’s analysis shows that these 
proxy voting rules can lead to distorted proxy contest outcomes: different 
directors being elected than if shareholders had been able to vote how they 
wished. These distortions are likely to have significant consequences for the 
affected companies and ex ante consequences for many more companies. 
Changes to corporate voting rules are currently the subject of an important 
policy debate. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed a 
universal proxy regulation, which would allow shareholders to vote for their 
preferred mix of nominees, and would eliminate distortions in proxy contest 
outcomes. But the rule has been met with substantial opposition. This Article 
provides the first empirical analysis of the extent of distortions, and the likely 
effects of universal proxies. 
The Article’s empirical analysis uses a comprehensive and largely hand-
collected data set. It demonstrates that distorted proxy contest outcomes are a 
real and practical problem. As many as 15% of proxy contests between 2001 and 
2016 may have had distorted outcomes. Contrary to the claims of most 
commentators, there is no empirical evidence that universal proxies would favor 
special interests or lead to more frequent proxy contests. 
The Article analyzes how the SEC should implement universal proxies and 
explains that a rule permitting corporations to opt out of universal proxies would 
be superior to the SEC’s proposed regulation, which would require all 
corporations to use universal proxies. If the SEC chooses not to implement a 
universal proxy regulation, the Article explains how investors could implement 
universal proxies through private ordering to adopt “nominee consent policies.” 
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Introduction 
Director elections are central to the functioning of corporations and their 
futures. They are even more important in light of the rise of hedge fund activism. 
However, federal and state rules governing director elections limit how 
shareholders can vote in election contests. This Article shows how this limitation 
creates the possibility of distortions in election outcomes: different directors 
being elected than a plurality of shareholders would have preferred. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed a “universal proxy” 
regulation that would allow shareholders to vote as they wish and eliminate the 
possibility of distortions. But the regulation has met with substantial opposition. 
This Article provides the first empirical evidence of the extent of distortions in 
proxy contest outcomes and the likely effects of universal proxies. Based on this 
evidence, the Article concludes that the SEC should adopt an opt-out version of 
its proposed universal proxy rule. If the SEC does not adopt universal proxies 
(including for political reasons), the Article proposes that corporations should 
adopt their own universal proxy arrangements by “nominee consent” policies as 
a second-best alternative. 
Director elections are central to the operations of corporations. This 
principle is enshrined both in state law1 and federal securities law.2 The directors 
chosen in elections determine the future course of the corporation. If the election 
process reelects directors that have made poor decisions, or fails to elect directors 
that are likely to make good decisions, then it can have a harmful effect on 
directors’ incentives in managing corporations. 
Director elections also lie at the crux of the contentious debate about the 
value of shareholder activism. Most director elections involve the nominees put 
forward by the corporation (“management nominees”), who are often elected 
unopposed. However, a small number of director elections are contested3 and 
involve dissidents who disagree with the direction taken by corporate 
management putting forward competing nominees for election. Contested 
elections take on an outsized significance, since only at these elections do 
investors have a choice among potential directors. These contests often 
determine the future direction of the corporation and involve great attention and 
activity. Incumbent directors and managers fight to maintain their positions and 
continue the corporation’s current direction; dissidents fight to replace directors 
and influence that direction. Shareholders are equally concerned with contested 
elections, as the value of their investment in the corporation is at stake. The 
 
 1.   See, e.g., Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The 
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power 
rests.”). 
 2.   The entire system of federal regulation of corporate disclosure is built upon Section 
14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which governs the solicitation of proxies for corporate 
elections. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012). 
 3.   Contested elections represent about 0.5% of director elections each year. See infra 
Table 4 and accompanying text. 
Universal Proxies 
4 
majority of dissidents initiating proxy contests are hedge fund activists, who 
acquire stakes in corporations they consider to be undervalued and seek to 
influence those corporations to increase value. The impact of this kind of 
shareholder activism on long-term value is currently the subject of considerable 
debate.4 In more than 90% of activist engagements, management and dissidents 
reach a settlement.5 The effects of contested elections have an impact well 
beyond the boundaries of the particular contest: their outcomes set the 
expectations of parties contemplating potential activist engagements or 
settlements of existing engagements regarding the likely outcome if the 
engagement is not settled. The importance of these elections for the corporate 
landscape, and the heightened conflict they present, means that the rules for how 
contested elections are conducted are of central importance. 
The combination of state and federal law that governs director elections 
limits shareholders’ ability to choose the nominees they may prefer in contested 
elections. Director elections are governed by state corporate law, which provides 
that director elections take place at shareholder meetings.6 Rather than attending 
the shareholder meeting, shareholders vote almost entirely by proxy. In this 
context, the word “proxy” refers to the power vested by the shareholder in 
persons (the “proxy holders”) to vote on behalf of the shareholder; the vesting 
takes place by the shareholder executing a form of proxy or “proxy card.”7 The 
proxy card instructs proxy holders to vote for a director or withholds authority 
from the proxy holder to vote for certain directors, which are commonly referred 
to as “withhold votes.” Proxy holders are required to attend the meeting and vote 
as instructed. 
In contested elections, each side solicits shareholders to execute their side’s 
proxy card, thereby appointing their representatives as the shareholders’ proxy 
holders. The Securities Exchange Act of 19348 empowered the SEC to regulate 
the solicitation of proxies.9 Part of the SEC’s proxy regulations, known as the 
“bona fide nominee rule,” prevents parties from soliciting proxies for nominees 
without the nominees’ consent.10 
 
 4.   See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 5.   See infra Table 1 and accompanying text. 
 6.   See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2017) (“Unless directors are elected by 
written consent in lieu of an annual meeting, an annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the 
election of directors . . . .”). Usually these are annual meetings, but they may also be special meetings 
called for the particular purpose. In a limited number of corporations, shareholders may also be able to 
act by written consent, including electing directors to fill vacancies on the board. 
 7.   So-called because the form of proxy that is generally solicited from shareholders is 
usually printed on card stock. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(2) (2017) (referring to “the proxy card”). 
 8.   Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78qq (2012). 
 9.   Id. § 78n(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or 
authorization in respect of any security . . . .”). 
 10.   See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (2017) (“No proxy shall confer authority: (1) To vote for 
the election of any person to any office for which a bona fide nominee is not named in the proxy statement 
. . . .”). The bona fide nominee rule had previously been incorporated into the precursor to Rule 14a-4 in 
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As a practical matter, this limits each side to using proxy cards which 
include only their own nominees. State law considers proxy cards executed by 
shareholders to revoke any proxy cards that they have previously executed,11 so 
shareholders cannot vote on multiple proxy cards solicited by different sides. In 
a contested election, these rules prevent shareholders voting on these cards from 
“mixing and matching” among nominees from different sides’ proxy cards,12 as 
the shareholders could do if they were to attend the meeting in person.13 
Marcel Kahan has analogized this situation to a political election, with “a 
Democratic voting station where you can only vote for Democrats and a 
Republican voting station where you can only vote for Republicans and there 
isn’t any option to split your vote,”14 for instance, by voting for a Democratic 
presidential candidate and a Republican senatorial candidate. In such a system, 
if a voter at a Democratic voting station wanted to support a Republican 
senatorial candidate, they could not vote for that nominee; the best they could do 
would be to not vote for the Democratic opponent. 
The solution to this problem is obvious. Parties could be permitted or 
required to solicit “universal proxies.” Universal proxies are simply proxy cards 
that include nominees from each side. The idea of a universal proxy should seem 
uncontroversial. No other common law jurisdictions use the split proxy system 
that governs corporate voting in the United States, and there are no close 
analogues in political elections. Investor groups have urged the SEC to adopt a 
universal proxy rule so that they would be able to mix and match their preferred 
 
1940. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-2376, 5 Fed. Reg. 174 (Jan. 12, 1940). The intention of the rule 
appears to have been to curb a practice whereby parties sought proxies to vote for nominees that, if elected, 
were expected to immediately resign and be replaced by other nominees that had not been named. See 
Ronald J. Gilson, Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, How the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive 
Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29, 40 (1991). (“Our 
best conjecture concerning the rule’s goal is to prevent dissidents (or management) from running dummy 
director candidates. Conceivably, opportunistic managers or challengers might seek to mislead voters by 
placing director candidates on their proxy who had not assented or did not intend to serve.”). In 1967, 
language was added to Rule 14a-4 to codify the administrative interpretation of “bona fide nominee[s]” 
as ones that had “consented to be named and to serve if elected.” See Exchange Act Release No. 34-8206, 
32 Fed. Reg. 20,960 (Dec. 14, 1967) 
 11.   See, e.g., Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Inv. Assocs., 51 A.2d 572, 580 (Del. Ch. 
1947), aff’d, 51 A.2d 572 (Del. 1947) (“[W]hen two proxies are offered bearing the same name, then the 
proxy that appears from the evidence to have been last executed will be accepted and counted under the 
theory that the latter – that is, more recent-proxy constitutes a revocation of the former.”); see also 
Concord Fin. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. of Del., 567 A.2d 1, 8 (Del. Ch. 1989) (reaffirming Investment 
Associates). 
 12.   As explained further in Part I, in the case of a “short slate” shareholders may be able 
to vote for certain management nominees on the dissident card, but only those selected by the dissidents, 
not any other mix that the shareholder may prefer. 
 13.   As explained further in Part I, shareholders wishing to vote for their own mix of 
management and shareholder nominees can execute a “legal proxy” to vote in their specified way at the 
meeting. However, this involves certain difficulties and is rarely used by shareholders. 
 14.   Ronald D. Orol, Universal Proxy Battle Fight Gathers Steam at SEC, THESTREET 




nominees.15 In response, the SEC has proposed a universal proxy regulation (“the 
Release”) aimed at allowing shareholders to vote by proxy in the same way that 
state law would permit them to vote if they attended the shareholder meeting.16 
However, the idea of a universal proxy has met with substantial opposition, led 
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Opponents of a universal proxy rule have 
raised concerns that it is likely to increase the ease and frequency of proxy fights 
and empower special interests.17 This opposition has resulted in the U.S. House 
of Representatives passing two bills that, if enacted, would have the effect of 
preventing the SEC from implementing a universal proxy rule.18 
This Article informs that debate. It provides a framework to understand the 
consequences of the mix-and-match problem and shows how it can result in 
distorted election outcomes. Prior to this Article there had been scant evidence 
about the extent of such distortions or the likely effects of a universal proxy rule 
on contest outcomes. As a result, there has been no basis to evaluate the claims 
made by opponents of the rule about the potential cost of universal proxies. The 
empirical analysis in this Article allows an evaluation of the extent of distortions 
in proxy contest outcomes, and the likely effects of universal proxies. 
One potential consequence of the mix-and-match problem in the current 
proxy voting rules is distortions in the outcomes of proxy contests. That is, 
 
 15.   See, e.g., Letter from Glenn Davis, Dir. of Research, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, 
to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Jan. 8, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2014/petn4-672.pdf [http://perma.cc/DD6V-D6UP] (requesting that 
the SEC “facilitate the use of universal proxy cards featuring a complete list of board candidates in cases 
of a contested election of directors”). 
 16.   Exchange Act Release No. 34-79164, 81 Fed. Reg. 79,122, 79,124 (Nov. 10, 2016) 
(“[R]eplicating the vote that could be achieved at a shareholder meeting is the most appropriate means to 
ensure that shareholders using the proxy process are able to fully and consistently exercise the ‘fair 
corporate suffrage’ available to them under state corporate law and that Congress intended our proxy rules 
to effectuate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 17.   Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to 
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives (June 22, 2016), 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/160622_kv_hr5485_financialservicesgen
eralgovernmentappropriationsact2017_house.pdf [http://perma.cc/SU39-MVWL] (urging members to 
“[s]upport an amendment [to the Act] expected to be offered that would place a funding limitation 
prohibiting the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from developing, implementing, finalizing 
or enforcing universal proxy ballot proposals or SEC rulemaking to allow or explore universal proxy 
ballots”); Letter from Tom Quaadman, Vice President, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, to Mary 
Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3-4 (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015-2.18-Letter-to-SEC-re-
Universal-Proxy-Roundtable.pdf [http://perma.cc/MJS8-A7XY] (“Mandating a universal ballot . . . would 
inevitably increase the frequency and ease of proxy fights . . . . [T]he universal ballot may empower a 
small vocal minority at the expense of the majority.”). 
 18.   See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 845 (2017) (“The 
Commission may not require that a solicitation of a proxy, consent, or authorization to vote a security of 
an issuer in an election of members of the board of directors of the issuer be made using a single ballot or 
card that lists both individuals nominated by (or on behalf of) the issuer and individuals nominated by (or 
on behalf of) other proponents and permits the person granting the proxy, consent, or authorization to 
select from among individuals in both groups.”); see also H.R. 5485, 114th Cong. § 1215 (2016) 
(containing identical language and proposing to prevent the SEC from using appropriated funds to 
“propose, issue, implement, administer, or enforce any requirement” of the kind described in § 845 of the 
Financial CHOICE Act bill). 
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different directors may be elected than if all shareholders had been able to vote 
as they wished, for instance, by attending the shareholder meeting or using a 
universal proxy. Distorted proxy contest outcomes can take two forms. First, 
there may be a distorted choice between the sides in the proxy contest. That is, 
the split between the number of management nominees elected and the number 
of dissident nominees elected may be different from the split which investors 
would have made had they been able to mix and match. Such a distorted choice 
between sides took place at the 2009 annual meeting of Biogen Idec Inc. Four 
nominees were elected: two management nominees and two dissident nominees. 
Had the average withhold votes on each side been voted in favor of nominees on 
the other side, management nominee Alan Glassberg would have been elected in 
place of dissident nominee Richard Mulligan. Mulligan’s election likely 
represented a distorted choice between sides. 
Second, there may be a distorted choice within sides. That is, the particular 
nominees that are elected from one side may be different from the nominees that 
investors would have chosen had they been able to mix and match. A distortion 
of this kind may have taken place at the 2015 annual meeting of Rovi 
Corporation. Seven board seats were up for election. Two dissident nominees 
were elected, along with five management nominees, including James Meyer. 
Had shareholders withholding votes been able to vote for opposing nominees 
and had the number of shareholders that preferred to vote for management 
candidate James O’Shaughnessy over Meyer exceeded the number that preferred 
Meyer over O’Shaugnessy by 18% of the votes cast on that card, O’Shaughnessy 
would have been elected in Meyer’s place. 
The Article’s empirical analysis shows that distorted proxy contests 
represent a real and practical problem. As many as 15% of proxy contests 
between 2001 and 2016 may have had distorted outcomes. Based on the most 
conservative assumptions about how shareholders could have voted under such 
a system, at least 7% of contests are likely to have been distorted, including 10% 
of contests at large corporations. 
The analysis shows no evidence to support the claim made by opponents of 
the regulation that universal proxies would favor shareholder activists. If 
anything, the actual effect is likely to favor managers. Of the contests where a 
distortion can be expected to have favored one side or the other, universal proxies 
can be expected to have resulted in management nominees being elected in place 
of dissident nominees in two-thirds of cases, compared to one-third of cases 
where dissident nominees would be elected in place of management nominees. 
This analysis permits inferences about the further effects of universal 
proxies that assuage many concerns raised in the debate. Concerns have focused 
on the possibility that universal proxies would increase the ease of proxy contests 
for dissidents or dissidents’ success rates in proxy contests. Since the evidence 
provides no basis to conclude that universal proxies would favor dissident 
nominees, there is also no evidence that dissidents are likely to initiate proxy 
contests more often under a universal proxy system. If anything, a universal 
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proxy system may lead to slightly fewer proxy contests. Universal proxies could 
only have resulted in different outcomes where at least 30% of votes were in 
favor of at least one dissident. Contrary to concerns raised by commentators, 
universal proxies are therefore unlikely to result in greater success for dissidents 
with parochial views that are not shared by a significant proportion of 
shareholders. 
These results present a puzzle. If universal proxies would be likely to favor 
managers and not dissidents, why are they opposed so strongly by groups that 
generally represent the interests of managers? It could be that these groups 
misunderstand the likely effect of the regulation. If this is the case, the evidence 
presented in this Article could cause them to relax their opposition. If they do 
not do so, one explanation may be that these groups are attacking universal 
proxies for their strategic value in a larger fight over increases in shareholder 
power.19 The value to such groups in opposing increases in shareholder power 
may outweigh the benefits that universal proxies would give their constituents in 
resisting dissidents. 
The normative value of universal proxies in eliminating distorted proxy 
contest outcomes is clear. However, it is much harder to determine the normative 
effects of which sides win proxy contests for two reasons. First, the effects of 
universal proxies on proxy contest outcomes presented in the Article describe a 
partial equilibrium: it is based on an analysis of voting data, holding constant 
many other factors, like the voting choices of investors, and the nomination 
choices of management and dissidents. Were universal proxies to be 
implemented, many of these other factors may change, with uncertain outcomes. 
Second, even if the full equilibrium effects of universal proxies on proxy contest 
outcomes and future proxy contests were known, the nature of the relationship 
between universal proxiesand shareholder value is not clear. Rather, it is the 
subject of considerable debate. For these reasons, it is impossible to undertake a 
comprehensive determination of the value or welfare effects of universal proxies. 
Instead, the SEC should consider the validity of the arguments made for 
and against universal proxies. The argument that universal proxies permit 
shareholders to vote as if they had attended the shareholder meeting is essentially 
a truism. However, the empirical analysis presented in the Article shows that 
shareholder voting with universal proxies would have more than mere expressive 
significance: it would eliminate a substantial number of distortions in proxy 
contest outcomes. This would have ex post and ex ante benefits for the 
management of corporations. The Article’s empirical analysis dispels the major 
arguments made against universal proxies that they are unlikely to favor special 
interests or will result in more proxy contests. This calculus has a clear 
conclusion: the SEC should implement a universal proxy regulation. 
 
 19.   See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 1997, 2006 (2014) (discussing the strategic and symbolic value of other corporate 
governance debates, including proxy access). 
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Proxy arrangements could be designed either to effectively prohibit 
universal proxies (like the current rule), to require universal proxies, or to permit 
universal proxies. A universal proxy regulation could make such arrangements 
mandatory for the entire set of corporations to which the rule applied, as with the 
SEC’s proposed rule. Alternatively, a regulation could be designed to permit 
private ordering, whereby corporations could opt out of (or opt into) the default 
proxy arrangement. Given the unresolvable uncertainties about the effects of 
universal proxies on shareholder value, it is possible that a mandatory rule may 
not be desirable for all corporations. If structured correctly, a privately ordered 
rule with universal proxies as the default would result in the same or greater 
aggregate net benefit as a mandatory rule. If universal proxies did prove to be 
costly for some companies, as opponents claim, then those companies would opt 
out of the default rule where the cost of universal proxies was greater than the 
cost of opting out. If this was not the case and no corporations opted out, the 
effects of a privately ordered rule would be the same as a mandatory rule. If any 
corporations opted out, the privately ordered rule would have greater aggregate 
net benefit. Since managers and insiders could privately benefit from proxy 
arrangements, managers or insiders who can determine the corporation’s proxy 
rules  may choose arrangements that are not in the best interests of the 
corporation. Private ordering can therefore only be optimal if opting out requires 
the approval of a majority of outside investors. I refer to this structure as 
“investor ordering.” 
An investor-ordered universal proxy rule would have additional 
advantages. Given their opposition to universal proxies, there is a substantial 
possibility that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the Business Roundtable 
might challenge the validity of a universal proxy regulation, as they have done 
in the past with proxy access and other SEC rules.20 Were the SEC to implement 
a mandatory universal proxy rule notwithstanding the advantages of investor-
ordering, its decision may be subject to invalidation as “arbitrary and capricious” 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.21 Were the SEC to instead implement 
an investor-ordered regulation, the potential costs of the regulation would be 
capped at the cost of opting out. This would considerably simplify the otherwise 
difficult consideration of the costs of the regulation, eliminating grounds on 
which the regulation could be challenged. 
 
 20.   See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(challenging, in collaboration with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the SEC’s conflict mineral rule on 
the grounds that it insufficiently considered the costs of the rule); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating the SEC’s proxy access rule); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 
443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (challenging SEC rulemaking requiring mutual funds to have independent 
directors); Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same); Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (challenging the SEC’s decision to bar self-regulatory 
organizations from listing dual-class stock). 
 21.   See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012); Bus. Roundtable, 647 




Despite the strength of the arguments in favor of universal proxies, the 
current SEC appears unlikely to move forward with the proposed regulation. If 
this were the case, a second-best solution would be for universal proxies to be 
implemented by individual corporations adopting “nominee consent policies.” 
Nominee consent policies would require any person nominated for election as a 
director to consent to be included in any proxy statement submitted for the 
election. This would permit either side to include the other’s nominees in a 
universal proxy if it so desired. If managers of corporations were not willing to 
implement nominee consent policies of their own volition, investors could bring 
precatory proposals requesting that directors implement such policies. 
Shareholders themselves could also amend corporate bylaws to include nominee 
consent policies. 
This remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I describes the 
background to contested director elections, including their importance, the “mix-
and-match” problem that arises from the current proxy system, and the universal 
proxy solution. Part II describes how distorted proxy contests can result from the 
current proxy system. Part III presents an empirical analysis of the incidence of 
distorted proxy contests and the likely effects of universal proxies. Part IV 
considers the implications of these effects for the universal proxies debate and 
evaluates the alternatives for implementing universal proxies by SEC regulation 
or nominee consent proposals. 
I. The Problem with Corporate Voting Rules 
Contested elections are a key feature of the corporate governance 
landscape. This Part explains why corporate elections—and contested elections 
in particular—are so important. It then discusses the set of rules that govern 
contested elections and how they can prevent investors from being able to vote 
for the set of director nominees that they would prefer. Universal proxies,  where 
a single voting card allows investors to vote for whichever set of director 
nominees that they would prefer, are the solution to this problem. This Part 
provides a brief history of universal proxies in the United States and their part in 
the important debate about corporate voting rules. 
A. The Importance of Corporate Elections 
Contested director elections are of central importance to the operation of 
corporations and to the corporate landscape more generally. State corporate law 
gives directors of corporations the power to manage the corporation. Director 
elections are the means by which shareholders appoint and replace directors. 
They therefore determine the future of the corporation, and are fundamental to 
both state corporate law and federal securities law. The rise of hedge fund 
activism in recent years has made director elections even more important: hedge 
fund activists exercise power by nominating (or threatening to nominate) their 
 Universal Proxies 
11 
own director nominees to the boards of directors of corporations. The number of 
contested director elections are relatively small, but these elections have 
disproportional importance because they are the only ones where shareholders 
have a real ability to replace directors and because such contests determine the 
background against which election contests take place. 
1. The Importance of Director Elections in Corporations 
A central feature of corporations is that they are managed by directors on 
behalf of their investors.22 Director elections therefore have two fundamental 
effects on the corporation. Director elections determine which directors will 
make decisions about the corporation in the future and therefore determine the 
future of the corporation. Director elections also have an ex ante effect on 
corporations, as the director selection mechanism determines how directors 
make decisions. If director elections reappoint directors that make bad decisions 
or fail to select those directors who are likely to make good decisions, then 
directors will have reduced incentives to make good decisions. Director elections 
are also the key protection provided to shareholders, who don’t have fixed 
contracts that protect their interests in the same way as other constituents such 
as creditors and employees.23 If shareholders do not agree with the decisions that 
directors make in managing the corporation, rather than interfering with those 
decisions or seeking judicial review of those decisions, shareholders’ main 
remedy is to appoint different directors that they believe will make decisions that 
they prefer.24 Most public corporations have a very large number of shareholders. 
Director elections also provide a way for the views of these shareholders to be 
aggregated and translated into a choice of directors that represents the 
preferences of the holders of a majority of the shares of the corporation. 
The importance of director elections is reflected in their fundamental 
positions in both state corporate law and federal securities law. Because director 
elections determine the choice of directors, state law regards them as “the 
 
 22.   Directors appoint executives to manage the corporation on their behalf and then 
monitor the strategy and performance of those managers. Although a distinction is often drawn between 
the directors of the corporation and the executives, who are sometimes referred to as the managers of the 
corporation, I will generally use the terms “managers” and “management” to refer to both directors and 
executives. 
 23.   Although directors have fiduciary duties, these are owed to the corporation and not 
to shareholders. Business judgments made by directors in their management of the corporation are 
generally shielded from judicial review, and the difficulties for shareholders in bringing claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty against directors weakens the extent to which fiduciary duties can be used to ensure that 
directors act in the interests of shareholders. 
 24.   See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 949, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the 
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate 
democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 
361-62 (2010) (“There is, furthermore, little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders 
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’” (quoting First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 794 (1978)). 
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ideological underpinning on which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”25 
The federal regulation of corporations after they become public is based in large 
part on the Securities Exchange Act’s regulation of proxy voting, the means by 
which investors elect directors.26 
2. Contested Election and Hedge Fund Activism 
Election contests have become more important in recent years because of 
the key role they play in hedge fund activism. Hedge fund activists are private 
investment funds that acquire significant minority stakes27 in corporations they 
believe to be underperforming and request that directors take strategic, 
operational, or financial actions to improve the performance of the corporation.28 
Hedge fund activists are able to cause the corporation to implement these actions 
by having their nominees elected to the board of directors through proxy contests 
or threatening to do so. Without the threat of an election contest to replace 
directors, activist investors would have no effective option to affect the 
operations of the corporation, and their requests could easily be dismissed by 
management. 
Hedge fund activists are only one of several types of dissidents that 
frequently nominate directors.29 In the past, many dissidents were potential 
acquirers seeking to gain control of the corporation without the agreement of the 
incumbent directors.30 In smaller corporations, dissidents may be former 
directors or executives that have been ousted from management of the 
corporation after internal disagreements. 
 
 25.   Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 26.   15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012). 
 27.   The stake is usually between 5% and 10% of the corporation’s common stock. See 
Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 
1748 (2008) (“The interquartile of hedge funds’ initial stakes is from 5.4% to 8.8%.”). 
 28.   For a discussion of hedge fund activism generally, see Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund 
Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009). 
 29.   A specific subset of hedge fund activists target “closed end funds,” which are 
publicly listed investment funds that invest in a portfolio of liquid assets. The value of the closed end fund 
shares is often trade at less than the aggregate value of their underlying assets. These hedge funds attempt 
to gain control of the funds in order to liquidate their portfolios and return the capital to investors, resulting 
in a net gain to investors. 
 30.   Since the development of “shareholder rights plans,” commonly referred to as 
“poison pills” in the mid-1980s, proxy contests are the only way for a potential acquirer to make an offer 
to buy the shares of the corporation from shareholders where the board of directors does not support the 
acquisition. Poison pills have the effect of preventing potential acquirers from acquiring over a fixed 
percentage of the corporation’s voting shares, usually 15% or 20%, without the consent of the board of 
directors. See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas., 16 A.3d 48, 94-101 (Del. Ch. 2011) (analyzing 
the history of poison pill jurisprudence and approving a poison pill); Moran v Household Int’l, Inc., 500 
A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (approving an early poison pill). For an academic analysis of the problems 
with poison pills, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002), and for the opposing view, see Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors 
Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002). In order to undertake the acquisition, the potential acquirer must 
first replace a majority of the board of directors through a proxy contest. 
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In recent years, hedge fund activism has become more common and has 
accounted for a majority of proxy contest activity, especially among larger 
corporations.31 According to data from FactSet Research Systems, contested 
elections involving activist investors represented 92% of the proxy contests 
announced at companies in the Russell 3000 Index from 2008 to 2015. Figure 1, 
below, shows the number of activist engagements announced at all U.S. 
corporations each year from 2000 to 2015.32 
Figure 1: Activist Engagements Announced, 2000-201533 
 
The influence of hedge fund activists on corporations has become the focus 
of considerable energy from corporations and investors and the subject of intense 
academic debate, especially about whether such influence improves the long-
term value of the corporation. Investor activism generally results in a short-term 
increase in the value of the corporation.34 Opponents of investor activism have 
expressed the view that, while it might increase the short-term value of 
 
 31.   Vyacheslav Fos, The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests, 63 MGMT. SCI. 655, 
656 (2016) (“The number (proportion) of proxy contests sponsored by activist hedge funds increased from 
162 (38%) from 1994 through 2002 to 440 (70%) from 2003 through 2012.”). 
 32.   See FACTSET RESEARCH SYSTEM, SHARKREPELLENT (database updated Nov. 
2017) [hereinafter SHARKREPELLENT], http://www.sharkrepellent.net/request?an=dt.pr&pg=login&rnd=
500199 [http://perma.cc/9TNS-ML4N]. The database provides information about engagements by 
activists, including proxy contests. FactSet, the database administrator, claims that the database includes 
all proxy contests since 2001, regardless of firm size. For each contest, the database provides information 
concerning the company, the dissident, and descriptive information about the contest, and the outcome. 
 33.   See id. 
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corporations as a result of myopic actions, it may harm the long-term value of 
the corporation.35 Others have suggested that this view is not correct, either as a 
theoretical matter,36 or as an empirical matter,37 and that the increases in value 
from activism are sustained in the long-term. 
This Article does not take a position on the value of investor activism, other 
than to note the intensity of the debate and the implications for the corporate 
landscape beyond the instances of engagements by dissidents. Managers spend 
considerable time and resources attempting to forestall activist interventions in 
order to maintain the direction for the company that they believe to be best and—
in the case of the directors opposed by dissidents—in order to maintain their 
positions. Investors in corporations are forced to determine whether they support 
activist interventions at those corporations and decide on rules that may increase 
or decrease the incidence of activist interventions.38 Finally, judges and 
regulators determine the ground rules against which activist engagements are 
conducted and must make decisions about the rules that best serve corporations 
and investors as a whole, including those by which proxy contests are conducted. 
3. The Effects of Corporate Voting Rules and Contested Elections 
There are a relatively small number of contested corporate elections where 
shareholders have a real choice among directors and the ability to replace 
incumbent directors, but these contests have outsized importance. 99.5%of 
elections of directors at large U.S. corporations between 2008 and 2015 were 
uncontested.39 In these elections, the only nominees for election to the board of 
directors that shareholders may vote for are those nominated by the incumbent 
board of directors itself. These elections are akin to political elections in a one-
party state: there is no choice between candidates and no possibility of replacing 
directors. The default requirement for the election of directors at these 
corporations is a plurality of votes cast. In an uncontested election, this means 
that so as long as nominees receive any votes, they will be elected.40 
 
 35.   See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 702 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the 
Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 551 (2016). 
 36.   See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term 
Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (2013). 
 37.   See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2015). 
 38.   Since shareholder activists are usually hedge funds, some investors in the 
corporation—notably public pension funds and endowments—may also consider investing in the activist 
hedge fund itself. 
 39.   Based on calculations from SHARKREPELLENT, supra note 32. For further 
information about the sample, see the discussion in infra Part III. 
 40.   Some corporations have adopted a “majority voting policy,” or a variation on it, 
which requires directors to receive at least a majority of the votes cast to be able to take their position or 
to tender their resignation if they do not receive at least such a majority. For a comprehensive discussion 
of plurality and majority voting in uncontested director elections, see Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority 
Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119 (2016). 
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Although rare, contested elections are fundamental events for corporations, 
often determining the future direction of the corporation. More importantly, 
contested elections have far-reaching consequences for other corporations. 
Figure 2 sets out a simple model of contested elections and their effects. 
Directors appoint managers to manage the corporation, and monitor their actions. 
The actions of managers in operating the corporation determine the value of the 
corporation to its shareholders. Potential dissidents consider whether to initiate 
a proxy contest by putting forward nominees for election as directors. If no 
dissidents put forward nominees, management nominees are uncontested at the 
corporation’s annual meeting and are elected unopposed. If a dissident does 
initiate a proxy contest, managers and dissidents have the possibility of reaching 
a settlement, which may involve managers appointing one or more dissident 
nominees to the board of directors.41 If no settlement is reached, the proxy 
contest goes to a vote. Shareholders cast their votes according to the proxy rules 
in force, and the aggregate vote determines which management nominees or 
dissident nominees are elected as the new directors of the corporation. Since 
directors oversee the actions of managers, election of dissident nominees may 
result in the removal of managers or influence managers to alter their operations 
of the corporation. 




 41.   For a discussion of settlements in proxy contests, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., 
Dancing with Activists, (Harvard Law and Econ. Discussion Paper No. 906, 2017), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2948869 [http://perma.cc/R3FW-7DVD]. 
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Figure 2 also sets out the effects of corporate voting rules and shareholder 
voting in election contests. These can be conceptualized into a chain of four 
levels of outcomes, marked as  to  in Figure 2. First, and most obviously, 
corporate voting rules determine how shareholders can vote in corporate 
elections. Second, shareholder votes determine election outcomes, such as which 
directors are elected. Third, election outcomes influence the expectations of 
dissidents and managers about the likely outcome of potential future proxy 
contests, which affect whether dissidents decide to initiate proxy contests, and 
whether managers and dissidents decide to settle proxy contests. Fourth, the 
extent to which dissidents initiate engagements and their likelihood of success 
affect managers’ and directors’ decisions about how to operate corporations and 
directors’ decisions whether to appoint or replace managers. These decisions, in 
turn, affect the value of corporations and of shareholders’ investments in 
corporations. 
The possibility of a dissident commencing a proxy contest and possibly 
having dissident nominees elected will also influence management decisions 
regarding the operation of the corporation and directors’ decisions about 
appointing and monitoring managers. The possibility of proxy contests therefore 
has effects on many more corporations than those at which proxy contests 
actually take place. 
The possibility of settlement of proxy contests means that contested 
elections take place at only a small subset of engagements between management 
and dissidents. Because proxy contests are costly for both management and 
dissidents, where the parties both expect that one or the other will prevail in the 
contest there is usually some other resolution: if the dissident is unlikely to be 
successful, they withdraw. If the dissident has a reasonable likelihood of success, 
there is a settlement between management and the dissident. Table 1, below, 
shows the number of engagements between corporations and dissidents 
announced between 2008 and 2015 for corporations in the Russell 3000 Index42 
and the actual number of proxy contests that were announced, as well as the 
number for which definitive proxy statements were filed and the contests that 
were actually voted upon. 
 
 42.   The Russell 3000 Index comprises the 3,000 largest public corporations listed in the 
United States by market capitalization. The composition of the index changes slightly from year to year, 
but from 2008 to 2017 the corporations included ranged in size from about $100-150 million to over $500 
billion. See Russell Index Market Capitalization Ranges, FTSE RUSSELL (May 12, 2017), 
http://www.ftserussell.com/research-insights/16ikulsk-reconstitution/market-capitalization-ranges 
[http://perma.cc/U7Z7-J9RZ]. 
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Table 1: Dissident Engagements and Proxy Contests Announced at 
Companies in the Russell 3000 Index, 2008-201543 
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As Table 1 shows, of the 1,295 engagements by dissidents with Russell 
3000 corporations between 2008 and 2015, only 108, or 8%, resulted in contested 
elections. The decrease in the numbers of proxy contests each year in Table 1 
results from engagements settling either before a proxy contest is announced, or 
if one is announced, before proxy statements are filed or voted upon. Only where 
the parties do not share similar beliefs about the likely outcome will a contested 
election actually be voted upon. 
The few engagements that go to a vote provide the main evidence of the 
likely outcomes of the very many engagements that do not result in contests. As 
a result, the small number of proxy contests that are voted upon take on an 
outsized importance in influencing other engagements. 
B. Corporate Voting Rules 
1. Proxy Voting 
Voting in director elections takes place by proxy and is governed by a 
combination of state and federal law. Shareholders execute a form of proxy or 
“proxy card,”44 which vests power in a person or persons (the “proxy holder”) to 
vote on behalf of the shareholder at the meeting of shareholders at which the 
election takes place. The proxy card is not a ballot—submission of a proxy card 
does not represent the act of voting itself. Instead, it specifies how the proxy 
holder is to vote on behalf of the shareholder. At the meeting, the proxy holder 
completes a ballot form aggregating the votes of all of the shareholders for which 
 
 43.   SHARKREPELLENT, supra note 32. 
 44.   See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(2) (2012). 
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it holds proxies.45 Proxy holders are appointed pursuant to state corporate law46 
and the proxy relationship is governed by agency principles, which are part of 
state common law. 
Federal securities laws govern the solicitation of proxies, imposing 
stringent requirements on parties that solicit proxies.47 In any corporate election, 
the corporation solicits proxies to vote as recommended by the directors. In 
contested elections, the dissidents also solicit their own proxies to vote for the 
dissident nominees. Federal securities laws require each side soliciting proxies 
to use their own proxy card, as well as to prepare detailed disclosure regarding 
the persons soliciting the proxies and their nominees. Rule 14a requires 
solicitations to contain certain information included in a proxy statement and 
places certain restrictions on the form of proxy cards. Among other things, proxy 
cards are required to provide a means for shareholders to “withhold” authority 
from their proxy holder to vote for particular nominees.48 
One provision of the federal proxy rules in particular has an important 
impact on the dynamics of proxy contests. Rule 14a-4 permits solicitation only 
for “bona fide nominees” named in the party’s proxy statement, which are 
nominees that have consented to such inclusion and intend to serve as directors 
if elected.49 In practice, parties do not agree to have their nominees included on 
other parties’ proxy cards,50 so the proxy card solicited by each party contains 
only its own nominees. If a shareholder wishes to vote for some or all of the 
management nominees, the shareholder returns the proxy card solicited by 
management, indicating which management nominees it wishes the proxy holder 
to vote for.51 If a shareholder wishes to vote for some or all of the dissident 
 
 45.   See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(e) (2017) (“All elections of directors shall 
be by written ballot unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation.”). 
 46.   See, e.g., id. § 212(b) (“Each stockholder entitled to vote at a meeting of 
stockholders . . . may authorize another person or persons to act for such stockholder by proxy.”). 
 47.   The solicitation of proxies is governed by Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-pp (2012), and the rules promulgated thereunder, primarily Rule 14a, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a (2017). 
 48.   17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (2017) (“Such form of proxy shall clearly provide any 
of the following means for security holders to withhold authority to vote for each nominee . . . .”). Before 
this provision was added in 1979, proxy cards did not provide a means for withholding authority to vote 
for particular nominees, and only provided for the election of the entire slate of nominees. See Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-16356, 44 Fed. Reg. 68,764 (Nov. 21, 1979). 
 49.   17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d) (2017) (“No proxy shall confer authority: (1) To vote for 
the election of any person to any office for which a bona fide nominee is not named in the proxy statement 
. . . .”). 
 50.   See, e.g., Inv’r Advisory Comm., Recommendations of the Investor as Owner 
Subcommittee Regarding SEC Rulemaking To Explore Universal Proxy Ballots, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N 2 (July 23, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/iac-
recommendation-universal-proxy.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KMQ-HE8R] (“Directors nominated by an 
incumbent board have only very rarely consented to being named as nominees in a proxy statement issued 
by a shareholder in opposition to management.”); see also discussion infra Section I.C. 
 51.   The proxy statement is required to provide that the proxy holder will vote the shares 
in accordance with the specifications on the proxy card. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(e) (2017). 
 Universal Proxies 
19 
nominees, it returns the proxy card solicited by the dissident, indicating which 
of the dissident nominees it wishes the proxy holder to vote for.52 
2. The Mix-and-Match Problem 
The bona fide nominee rule combines with state law rules to create a 
peculiar problem. State law prevents shareholders from executing more than one 
proxy card. A proxy card executed by a shareholder supersedes and revokes any 
proxy card previously executed by that shareholder.53 Because shareholders can 
execute a proxy card solicited by only one the parties, and those proxies contain 
only the nominees of that side, shareholders cannot “mix and match” candidates 
from different sides of the contest; the proxy voting rules effectively limit the 
expressive ability of shareholders to vote for the mix of nominees that they 
prefer, if they wish to vote on a solicited proxy card. For instance, if there are 
four contested board seats up for election, shareholders cannot use proxy cards 
solicited by the parties to vote for two of the management nominees and two of 
the dissident nominees. At most, they can vote on the management card for two 
nominees or on the dissident card for two nominees, in each case withholding 
their votes from the other two nominees on the card. 
In uncontested elections, withholding votes from nominees has become a 
way for shareholders to signal their disapproval of directors.54 In a contested 
election, withholding votes is inferior to voting for an opposition candidate. The 
winners of the contest are determined by the number of votes cast for the 
candidate.55 As a result, withheld votes are not considered in determining the 
successful nominee. Compared to voting for a nominee (for example, if the 
shareholder is voting for all of the other nominees on that side),shareholders 
withholding their votes will have some effect, as the nominee will receive fewer 
votes than if the shareholders had voted for them. But the opposing nominee will 
not receive any additional votes. 
The mix-and-match problem appears to be unique to corporate voting in 
the United States. In most advanced common law countries, including the United 
 
 52.   Where a dissident nominates candidates for less than half of the positions on the 
board of directors (a “short slate”) they may also solicit proxies to vote for those management nominees 
that they do not oppose. See id. § 240.14a-4(d)(4). 
 53.   See., e.g., Concord Fin. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. of Del., 567 A.2d 1, 8 (Del. 
Ch. 1989); Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Inv. Assocs., 51 A.2d 572, 580 (Del. Ch. 1947). 
 54.   Joseph Grundfest initially suggested withholding votes as part of a “just vote no” 
campaign. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians 
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 865 (1993) (“[S]hareholders can express their lack of confidence 
in management’s performance by marking their proxy cards to withhold authority for the reelection of 
these corporate board.”). For an empirical analysis of the purposes for which shareholders withhold votes, 
see Yonca Ertimur et al., Understanding Uncontested Director Elections, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 1), http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/pdf/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2760 [http://perma.cc/C9RJ-
ULL4]. 
 55.   See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2017) (“Directors shall be elected by a 
plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled 
to vote on the election of directors.”). 
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Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia, dissidents do not use their own proxy 
card. Instead, shareholders have robust rights to include items in the agenda of 
shareholder meetings, including putting forward dissident nominees for 
election.56 These nominees are then included in the form of proxy distributed by 
the corporation. There is therefore one proxy card that includes all of the 
nominees.57 It is also difficult to find close analogues to the mix-and-match 
problem in political contests or other voting scenarios outside corporate 
elections.58 
The above discussion assumes that shareholders vote on proxy cards 
solicited by the parties. Shareholders have two alternatives that avoid the effect 
of the mix-and-match problem, however these are rarely used. First, shareholders 
may also choose to grant a proxy that they design themselves, commonly referred 
to as a “legal proxy.” Because the proxy has not been solicited, SEC proxy rules, 
including the bona fide nominee rule, do not apply.59 As a result, shareholders 
 
 56.   REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 53 (3d ed. 2017) (“[A]lmost all jurisdictions permit a 
qualified minority (usually a small percentage) of shareholders to contest the board’s slate by adding 
additional nominees to the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting.”); see also Council Directive No. 
2007/36, O.J. L 184/17 (2007), Art. 6 (requiring European Union member states to ensure that 
shareholders have the right to put items on the agenda of the general meeting). The right to include items 
in the agenda of general meetings was already in place at most member states prior to 2007. See Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Exercise of Voting Rights by 
Shareholders of Companies Having Their Registered, SEC (2006) 81 88-91 (Feb. 17, 2006) (detailing the 
rights to place items on agenda and table resolutions in 27 European jurisdictions). 
 57.   The United States has long considered whether corporations should be required to 
include shareholder nominees in the corporation’s proxy card and other proxy materials, a proposal 
commonly referred to as “proxy access.” See Amended Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-3347, 
7 Fed. Reg. 10653 (Dec. 18, 1942) (describing, among other revisions considered but not adopted, “[t]he 
suggestion that minority stockholders be given an opportunity to use the management’s proxy material in 
support of their own nominees for directorships.”). Attempts by the SEC to introduce requirements for 
proxy access have been unsuccessful. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(striking down the SEC’s proxy access regulation). Many companies have amended their bylaws to allow 
proxy access. However, most proxy access bylaws do not permit proxy access by dissidents that intend to 
change or influence control of the corporation. See Gail Weinstein & Philip Richter, Universal Proxy 
Unlikely to be Adopted (and Would Have Little Effect Anyway), HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/21/universal-proxy-unlikely-to-
be-adopted-and-would-have-little-effect-anyway [https://perma.cc/RY2G-6XAT]. This and other 
stringent requirements on the use of proxy access mean that the great majority of dissidents are unlikely 
to use proxy access to put forward their nominees for election. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The 
Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1409 (2011) (discussing the impediments to 
dissidents using proxy access at length, and concluding that “[o]verall, for most dissidents, proxy access 
would not represent an attractive alternative”). 
 58.   The system has superficial similarities to the U.S. partisan primary election contest, 
where citizens choose which party they want to select nominees from and then are restricted to voting on 
that party’s ballot, for that party’s nominee. However, corporate elections are conceptually different 
because they involve only one stage and does not have a second contest among the primary winners. The 
appropriate analogy to the corporate election would be if the winner of the general election were 
determined by how many primary votes each nominee received. 
 59.   Rule 14a-1 provides that a solicitation must include: “(i) Any request for a proxy 
whether or not accompanied by or included in a form of proxy; (ii) Any request to execute or not to 
execute, or to revoke, a proxy; or (iii) The furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to 
security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or 
revocation of a proxy.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (2017). 
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can authorize the proxy holder to vote for whichever nominee the shareholder 
wishes to specify. Second, if a shareholder is the “record owner” of their shares, 
they can attend the shareholder meeting and vote in person. However, in most 
cases, investors are not the record owner of their shares. They hold their shares 
through intermediaries, such as brokers, banks, and custodians,60 referred to as 
holding “in street name.” They would need a legal proxy from the registered 
owner of the shares to attend the shareholder meeting. Legal proxies are not 
straightforward to use, because of the complexity of share ownership61 and its 
effects on shareholder voting.62 These complexities affect all proxies, but 
systems and intermediaries have developed to facilitate voting by solicited 
proxies, which do not apply to legal proxies.63 Legal proxies are therefore more 
onerous and costly to use than the standard voting machinery.64 They are used 
only by large investors with the most sophisticated staff, 65 and even among such 
investors, only infrequently.66 
 
 60.   Brokers and custodians in turn hold shares through a single securities depository, 
the Depository Trust Corporation (DTC). 
 61.   The complexity in the share ownership system results from the need to rapidly and 
efficiently transfer ownership of shares purchased through modern markets and trading systems. 
Requiring purchases of shares to be reflected in the books of the corporation, as was formerly the case, 
substantially hinders the ability of shareholders to rapidly trade their shares on markets or trading 
platforms. To solve this problem, record ownership of most shares was transferred to the DTC. Marcel 
Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1237-38 (2008). 
 62.   This system of ownership and voting is sometimes referred to as “proxy plumbing.” 
See Kara Scannell, SEC Probes “Proxy Plumbing,” WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703792704575366910882553810 
[https://perma.cc/AW7J-BJFG] (describing the SEC’s concept release describing proxy plumbing issues 
and soliciting comment); see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-62495, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982 (Jul. 22, 
2010). For a discussion of many of these issues and how they affect shareholder voting, see Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 57. 
 63.   The DTC gives an omnibus proxy for the shares of which it is the record owner, 
which gives each bank and custodian for which it holds shares the power to give proxies for those shares. 
Brokers and custodians in turn distribute a “voting instruction form” to each of the beneficial owners, 
asking how they wish to vote. The broker or custodian then aggregates the voting instructions they receive 
and provides an omnibus proxy to the proxy holder with respect to those shares. This process has been 
streamlined by corporations, brokers, and banks through intermediaries that design and distribute the 
voting instruction forms to beneficial owners, operate platforms for beneficial owners to provide voting 
instruction electronically, telephonically or by mail, and receive and tabulate the completed instructions. 
Broadridge and proxy advisers such as Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) and Glass, Lewis & 
Co. provide electronic platforms for investors to submit their proxy cards electronically. 
 64.   A legal proxy is generally drafted by an attorney and requires coordination among 
the investor, the custodian, and any other intermediaries. In contrast, completing a voting instruction form 
is very straightforward for the beneficial owner and does not require a lawyer or coordination with the 
custodian. 
 65.   See Inv’r Advisory Comm., supra note 50, at 1 (“The complexity and expense of 
exercising full voting rights for the election of directors while not attending a shareholders meeting in 
person are substantial, and typically only large institutional holders ever avail themselves of these 
procedures.”). 
 66.   One question is why very large investment funds do not use legal proxies more 
often. One explanation is the investment managers of these funds bear the cost of voting themselves, and 
cannot pass them on to the investment funds that they manage. Because the investment manager will 
capture only a tiny percentage of the benefit to the corporation from voting in the right way, they will not 
have incentives to spend significant amounts on that decision. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency 
Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 96 (2017). If an investment fund has a 5% 
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3. The Universal Proxy Solution 
The solution to the mix-and-match problem created by the proxy rules is 
conceptually straightforward. Parties could be permitted or required to solicit 
“universal proxies.” A universal proxy is a single proxy card that includes all of 
the management and dissident nominees for election as directors at a particular 
meeting. Shareholders could use the universal proxy to vote for as many 
nominees as there are seats available for election, in whichever combination they 
prefer. 
Recent support for universal proxies has led the SEC to propose a universal 
proxy rule. The universal proxies rule has gained support from investor groups, 
but garnered opposition from groups traditionally associated with corporate 
managers. However, to date, there has been a dearth of evidence on the likely 
effects of universal proxies. Although universal proxies were first proposed more 
than twenty-five years ago, a universal proxy has never been used in a proxy 
fight at a major U.S. corporation.67 As a result, neither those advocating universal 
proxies nor those opposing them have any evidence to back up their claims 
regarding the effects of a universal proxy rule.68 
C. A Brief History of Universal Proxies in the United States 
Since they were first proposed in 1991,69 there have been several attempts 
to use universal proxies in proxy contests in the United States, although their use 
 
investment in a company that is involved in a proxy contest that has a market value of $1 billion—i.e., a 
$50 million investment—and a certain outcome would increase the value of the company and the 
investment by 1% ($500,000), and the investment manager charges a fee of 0.1%, the investment manager 
would capture only $500 from voting in the right way. 
 67.   As discussed further below, a universal ballot was used at a proxy contest at a large 
U.S. corporation, and a Canadian and a Swiss corporation listed in the U.S. have used universal proxies 
in contested elections. 
 68.   The SEC staff conceded this dearth of evidence in the Release. See Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-79164, supra note 16, at 79,163 (“[E]ither more registrant nominees or more dissident 
nominees might be elected than under the [current arrangement] . . . . However, these effects are uncertain 
because it is difficult to predict the extent or direction of any changes in voting behavior as a result of the 
proposed amendments . . . .”). 
 69.   An early suggestion of a universal proxy came in after the SEC proposed 
amendments to the proxy rules in 1991. Exchange Act Release No. 34-29315, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,987 (June 
17, 1991). Ronald Gilson, Lilli Gordon, and John Pound published an academic article analyzing the 
problem, and the difficulties it created for vote splitting. Ronald J. Gilson et al., How the Proxy Rules 
Discourage Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17 J. 
CORP. L. 29 (1992). They proposed that the SEC revise the wording of the bona fide nominee rule to 
permit parties soliciting proxy cards to include nominees that had consented to be named in any proxy 
statement—so that either party could include nominees that had been named in either proxy statement. In 
a comment letter to the SEC on the proposed changes, a group of law professors led by Bernard Black 
endorsed a similar suggestion. Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1 (1992). In 
its 1992 release adopting the amendments, the SEC adverted to the universal proxy rule, but indicated that 
it had chosen not to adopt it because of the substantial changes it would involve to the proxy rules. 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 16, 1992) (“Proposals to require the 
company to include shareholder nominees in the company’s proxy statement would represent a substantial 
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has never been agreed upon or employed in a major proxy contest at a U.S. 
corporation.70 A universal proxy was proposed by dissidents at Pershing Square, 
L.P. for the 2009 annual meeting of Target Corporation,71 Trian Fund 
Management, L.P. for the 2015 annual meeting of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and 
Company,72 and Pershing Square L.P. for the 2017 annual meeting of Automatic 
Data Processing, Inc. (ADP).73 Target,74 Du Pont,75 and ADP76 all refused 
consent for their management nominees to be included on the dissident cards. 
Management of three corporations have attempted to use universal proxy cards: 
Tessera Technologies, Inc. for its 2013 annual meeting, for which Starboard 
Value LP had nominated directors for election;77 Shutterfly, Inc., for its 2015 
annual meeting, for which Marathon Partners Equity Management, LLC had 
nominated directors78; and GrafTech International Ltd., for its 2015 annual 
meeting, for which Nathan Milikowsky (a former director) had nominated 
 
change in the Commission’s proxy rules. This would essentially mandate a universal ballot including both 
management nominees and independent candidates for board seats.”). 
 70.   At three proxy contests at two small-capitalization U.S. corporations, Research 
Frontiers Inc. and BIOLASE, Inc., management proxy statements included dissident nominees. However, 
these were more akin to proxy access situations, than universal proxies, as neither dissident solicited 
proxies at the contests. See BIOLASE, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 1 (Apr. 3, 2015); 
BIOLASE, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 2 (July 29, 2014); Research Frontiers Inc., 
Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 7 (Apr. 25, 2012) (“Although the Company could have 
excluded [dissident nominee Darryl Daigle] from its proxy statement pursuant . . . , the Company elected 
to include the proposal.”). 
 71.   See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., Letter to Target Corporation, Filed as 
Exhibit to Additional Soliciting Material (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 21, 2009). This was suggested by 
Professor Gilson, one of the coauthors of the 1991 article describing the problems with one-sided proxies. 
See Gilson et al., supra note 69. 
 72.   Trian’s letter to the company requesting universal proxies was not filed with the 
SEC. But see Antoine Gara, Trian’s Proxy War With DuPont Revives Dormant Voting Debate, FORBES 
(Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2015/03/03/trians-proxy-war-with-dupont-
revives-dormant-voting-debate. 
 73.   See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P, Letter to Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 
Filed as Exhibit to Additional Soliciting Material (Schedule 14A) (Sept. 15, 2017). 
 74.   Target Corp., Definitive Additional Proxy Soliciting Material on Form 14A (Apr. 
21, 2009) (suggesting that it “would cause delay and confusion”). Target did not respond to a request to 
use its nominees on the Pershing Square proxy card. See Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., Press 
Release Filed as Soliciting Material (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 21, 2009). Target also rebuffed a suggestion 
from Pershing Square that it facilitate a universal ballot solution as had been used at CSX, described 
below. See Target Corp., Letter to Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P., Filed as Exhibit to 
Additional Soliciting Materials (Schedule 14A) (May 26, 2009). 
 75.   E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Letter to Nelson Peltz, Filed as Exhibit to 
Additional Soliciting Materials (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 3, 2015). 
 76.   Automatic Data Processing, Inc., Letter to Pershing Square Capital Management, 
L.P., Filed as Exhibit to Additional Soliciting Materials (Schedule 14A) (Sept. 22, 2017) (contending that 
switching to a universal proxy “would result in significant risks of confusion and disenfranchisement for 
our stockholders”). 
 77.   Tessera Techs., Inc., Letter to Olshan Frome Wolosky, Filed as Exhibit to Definitive 
Additional Materials (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 29, 2013). 
 78.   Shutterfly, Inc., Press Release Filed as Additional Soliciting Material (Schedule 
14A) (May 22, 2015). 
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directors.79 Both Starboard80 and Marathon81 refused to consent to their 
nominees being included on the management proxy card. In the GrafTech 
contest, both parties consented to the inclusion of their nominees on each other’s 
proxy card.82 However, while the proxy contest was pending, the company 
agreed to be acquired,83 and as a result the proxy contest did not go to a vote. In 
a proxy contest that was pending at the time this Article was published, the 
management of Mellanox Technologies, Ltd., an Israeli company listed on the 
Nasdaq exchange, attempted to require both sides to use a universal proxy in a 
contest initiated by Starboard Value LP, by use of a nominee consent policy.84 
That universal proxies have been suggested equally frequently by management 
and dissidents suggests that either side may benefit from distortions in the current 
system of proxy voting and that different sides may benefit from a universal 
proxy in different situations. Each instance seems to have involved some attempt 
by the party proposing a universal proxy to gain a tactical advantage. In several 
of the cases where management has proposed a universal proxy, it would have 
delayed the annual meeting, which may have been to the advantage of 
management in those cases.85 Proposing a voting mechanism that institutional 
investors prefer may also give that side a public relations advantage. 
These potential public relations benefits, or the tactical advantages that 
delays in instituting a universal proxy in a contest might require, are likely to 
 
 79.   GrafTech Int’l Ltd., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 13, 2015); 
Nathan Milikowsky, Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 23, 2015). 
 80.   Starboard Value L.P., Letter to Skadden Arps, Filed as Exhibit to Additional 
Soliciting Material (Schedule 14A) (May 2, 2013) (refusing on the basis that the suggestion came three 
weeks before the meeting, and both sides had already mailed their proxy cards, and claiming it would 
“create further delay and confusion for shareholders” and would require that voting be reset, potentially 
disenfranchising shareholders that had already voted). 
 81.   Marathon Partners Equity Mgmt., LLC, Letter to Gordon Davidson, Counsel to 
Shutterfly, Inc., Filed as Definitive Additional Material (Schedule 14A) (May 26, 2015) (refusing on 
the basis that the suggestion came three weeks before the meeting, and after both sides had mailed 
definitive proxy statements, and claiming that the suggestion was an attempt to “manipulate the timing or 
voting mechanics” of the meeting). 
 82.   GrafTech Int’l Ltd., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 7 (Apr. 13, 
2015); Nathan Milikowsky, Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 19 (Apr. 23, 2015). 
 83.   GrafTech Int’l Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 (May 18, 2018). 
 84.   After Starboard announced that it would put forward nominees for election to the 
board of Mellanox at its May 2018 annual meeting, Mellanox delayed its annual meeting to July 2018, so 
that it could hold an extraordinary general meeting in May 2018 for the purpose of approving two changes 
to its articles of incorporation, one of which would implement a nominee consent policy that, if adopted, 
would require any nominee for election to consent to be included in a universal proxy, and would require 
both parties to use a universal proxy in any contested election. Mellanox Technologies, Ltd., Preliminary 
Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 14-15 (Mar. 7, 2018). 
 85.   As mentioned in supra notes 80 and 81, the dissidents in the Tessera and Shutterfly 
contests both responded that using a universal proxy would affect the timing of the meeting. In the 
Mellanox contest, Starboard responded that the “the only reason Mellanox is proposing the EGM is to 
purposely delay the 2018 Meeting.” Letter to the Shareholders of Mellanox Technologies, Ltd., Filed as 
Exhibit to Additional Soliciting Material (Schedule 14A), at 1 (Mar. 12, 2018). Starboard offered to work 
with Mellanox for both parties to use a universal proxy without the need for a nominee consent policy, 
however Mellanox rejected the offer. See id. at 2; Mellanox Technologies, Ltd., Letter to Olshan Frome 
Wolosky LLP, Attached as Exhibit to Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Mar. 15, 2018). 
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have played a part in decisions to propose or to reject suggestions of universal 
proxies. A party is likely to propose a universal proxy where it appears likely 
that none of their nominees would be elected under the current proxy voting 
system, but some of its nominees might be elected if a universal were to be 
used.86 In each of the three cases where dissidents proposed universal proxies, 
there were signals before the meeting that there was support for electing a mix 
of dissident and management nominees,87 suggesting that a universal proxy may 
have led to the election of some dissident nominees, but in each case none of the 
dissident nominees were elected.88 Similarly, where management proposed a 
universal proxy card in the Tessera and Shutterfly contests, there were signals of 
support for a mix of management and dissidents.89 In both cases, without a 
universal proxy, dissidents nominees received very significant support.90 
Conversations with practitioners involved in proxy contests and articles issued 
by practitioners, suggest that there may now be a greater recognition of the 
impact of universal proxies on voting, and a greater willingness on the part of 
managers to consider universal proxies in particular contests, especially where 
managers believe that dissidents nominees are likely to receive substantial 
support.91 
Some evidence of how a universal proxy might function in the United 
States can be gleaned from the use of a universal ballot by one U.S. corporation, 
CSX, and by the use of universal proxies at two foreign corporations listed in the 
United States. A universal ballot—as opposed to a universal proxy—was used 
in a proxy contest at the 2008 annual meeting of CSX Corporation. CSX is 
incorporated in Virginia. Whereas ballots at most other corporations are 
submitted at the meeting, generally by proxy holders on behalf of shareholders 
not attending the shareholder meeting, CSX circulated a ballot to shareholders 
and permitted them to submit it electronically, as permitted by Virginia’s Stock 
Corporation Act.92 The CSX voting results show that many shareholders used 
 
 86.   Weinstein & Richter, supra note 57. 
 87.   In each case, proxy advisor ISS had favored some (but not all) of the dissident 
nominees. Data from SharkRepellent.net, last accessed March 23, 2018. See supra note 32.  
 88.   Data from SharkRepellent.net. See id.  
 89.   In the Tessera contest, ISS recommended for two of the six dissident nominees; in 
the Shutterfly contest, it recommended for two of the three dissidents. Data from SharkRepellent.net, last 
accessed March 23, 2018. See id. 
 90.   At Shutterfly, two of three dissident nominees were elected. Data from 
SharkRepellent.net, last accessed March 23, 2018. See id. The day before the Tessera meeting, when they 
were likely to have known the voting results, management agreed to appoint all of the dissident nominees. 
Tessera Technologies, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 24, 2013). 
 91.   See, e.g., Weinstein & Richter, supra note 57; David Whissel, Universal Proxies 
Move Forward, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 28, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/28/universal-proxies-move-forward [https://perma.cc/LYB5-
VAKT]. 
 92.   See VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-664.1.E (2007) (“If authorized by the board of directors, 
any shareholder vote to be taken by written ballot may be satisfied by a ballot submitted by electronic 
transmission by the shareholder or the shareholder’s proxy, provided that any such electronic transmission 
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this method to split their vote among the management and dissident candidates.93 
A universal ballot was also used in a proxy contest initiated by Pershing Square 
at the 2012 annual meeting of Canadian corporation Canadian Pacific Railway 
Limited,94 and at a proxy contest initiated by Carl Icahn at the 2013 annual 
meeting of Swiss corporation Transocean Ltd.95 Canadian proxy rules did not 
contain a rule preventing parties from soliciting for other nominees, and Swiss 
securities law required the use of a universal proxy. Because both corporations 
are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, proxies were solicited from U.S. 
shareholders. Universal proxies did not appear to create significant problems for 
either party in the Transocean or Canadian Pacific proxy contests or for 
intermediaries involved in those contests, suggesting that universal proxies are a 
feasible alternative to the current system of proxy voting. 
D. The Debate About Universal Proxies 
Following the attempted uses of universal proxies at U.S. corporations 
described above, there were calls for the SEC to adopt a universal proxy rule. In 
2013, the Investor as Owner Subcommittee of the Investor Advisory Committee 
 
shall either set forth or be submitted with information from which it can be determined that the electronic 
transmission was authorized by the shareholder or the shareholder’s proxy.”). 
 93.   A large pension fund shareholder, the State Board of Administration Florida, also 
stated that it had split its vote, rather than voting only for two dissidents and withholding the remainder 
of its votes as it would have done had the universal ballot not been provided. SBA Proxy Vote 
Decisionmaking: A Case Analysis of the 2008 TCI/3G Versus CSX Proxy Contest, ST. BD. OF ADMIN. 
FLA. 86-87 (2009) (“For the entire stock position of 1,156,413 shares, the SBA voted in favor of all of 
CSX’s nominees except three; . . . We voted in favor of two of the dissident candidates . . . . If the CSX 
vote had been an all or nothing vote . . . then the SBA likely would have voted the entire dissident slate 
. . . . This procedure allowed the SBA to exercise its entire vote by voting for the dissident and incumbent 
candidates that it desired to elect.”). 
 94.   At the 2012 annual meeting of Canadian Pacific Railway Limited, for which 
Pershing Square had put forward nominees, Canadian Pacific elected to use a universal proxy card, 
including the Pershing Square nominees along with its own nominees in its proxy card, and Pershing 
Square followed suit. See Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd., Form of Proxy – English (Mar. 22, 2012) 
(management proxy card); Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd., Form of Proxy – English (Apr. 5, 2012) 
(Pershing Square proxy card). On the morning of the meeting, presumably in response to the proxy returns, 
Canadian Pacific announced the resignation of its CEO and four other directors, resulting in all seven 
Pershing Square nominees and nine management nominees being elected by default. See Ian Austen, 
Ackman Wins Proxy Fight at Canadian Pacific, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 17, 2012), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/canadian-pacific-c-e-o-and-five-directors-step-down 
[https://perma.cc/5A4A-TAW6]. The corporation did not release results of the vote for the six directors 
that resigned, making it difficult to interpret the results. Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd., Report on Voting 
Results (May 18, 2012). 
 95.   The parties solicited identical proxy cards, each containing five nominees put 
forward by management and three nominees put forward by Icahn. See Transocean Ltd., White Proxy 
(Schedule 14A) (Apr. 2, 2013); Icahn Partners LP, Gold Proxy (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 17, 2013). Four 
management nominees and one Icahn nominee were elected. See Transocean Ltd., Current Report (Form 
8-K) (May 20, 2013). 
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(IAC) of the SEC96 recommended that the SEC consider a universal ballot rule.97 
The Council on Institutional Investors subsequently petitioned the SEC to 
consider adopting a universal proxy rule.98 Two SEC commissioners also urged 
consideration of the issue.99 As a result of these efforts, the then-Chair of the 
SEC, Mary Jo White, announced that the SEC would consider a universal proxy 
rule.100 The arguments made in favor of a universal proxy focused on the fact 
that it would improve investor suffrage by enhancing the ability of investors to 
vote in proxy contests. This argument focuses narrowly on the first of the four 
levels of the effect of corporate voting rules described in Section I.0 above, 
determining how shareholders are able to vote.101 This “expressive” argument 
disregards the effect of universal proxies on proxy contest outcomes, future 
contests, and the value of corporations. 
The idea of a universal proxy rule met with staunch opposition. After Chair 
White announced that the SEC would consider a universal proxy rule, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce lobbied Congress to prevent the SEC from implementing 
universal proxies.102 This resulted in an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2017 
 
 96.   The IAC was established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act to, inter alia, “advise and consult with the Commission on— (i) regulatory priorities of the 
Commission; . . . (iii) initiatives to protect investor interest; and (iv) initiatives to promote investor 
confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace; and (B) submit to the Commission such findings 
and recommendations as the Committee determines are appropriate, including recommendations for 
proposed legislative changes.” See Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010 § 911, 15 
U.S.C. § 78a (2012) (adding to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 39, 15 U.S.C. § 78pp (2012)). 
 97.   The recommendation was presented to the Committee by Roy Katzovicz, the Chief 
Legal Officer of Pershing Square, who had been involved in the Target proxy contest and the Canadian 
Pacific proxy contest, and subsequently remained a vocal advocate for a universal proxy rule. 
 98.   Letter from Davis, supra note 15. 
 99.   Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Seeing Capital Markets 
Through Investor Eyes, (Dec. 15, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch120513-2laa 
[http://perma.cc/T6KG-NR8K]; Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 
“SEC Speaks” Conference: What Lies Ahead? The SEC in 2016 (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/stein-sec-speaks-2016.html [http://perma.cc/3VGT-8PP2]; Kara M. 
Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Toward Healthy Companies and a Stronger Economy, 
Remarks to the U.S. Treasury Department’s Corporate Women in Finance Symposium (Apr. 30 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/stein-toward-healthy-companies.html [http://perma.cc/X7PW-LJ2U]; 
Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Council of Institutional Investors 
(May 8, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch050814kms [http://perma.cc/YP8A-QLX6]. 
 100.   Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Building Meaningful 
Communication and Engagement with Shareholders (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/building-meaningful-communication-and-engagement-with-
shareholde.html [http://perma.cc/H8WL-HNU4]. 
 101.   This would seem to be grounded in ideas of corporate or shareholder democracy. 
For a discussion of the ideas of shareholder democracy, see, for example, FRANK D. EMERSON & 
FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS 
(1954); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53 
(2008); and Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy 
Symposium: Understanding Corporate Law through History, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389 (2006). 
 102.   Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
to Chairman Andrew Crenshaw and Ranking Member José Serrano (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/160524_fy17financialservicesgeneralgov
ernmentappropriations_crenshaw_serrano.pdf [http://perma.cc/PHF9-X5ZC]; see also Letter from Josten, 
supra note 17 (encouraging Congress to set a funding limitation to block the universal proxy rule); Letter 
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Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bill that would have 
effectively prohibited the SEC from developing, implementing, finalizing, or 
enforcing a universal proxy rule.103 The bill was not passed by the Senate, but 
identical language is included in the draft Financial CHOICE Act bill,104 and in 
the draft 2018 Financial Services and General Governance Appropriations 
bill.105 
This opposition was based on concerns that mandating universal proxies 
would “increase the frequency and ease of proxy fights,” which the Chamber of 
Commerce describes as being harmful to corporations, and “empower[ing] a 
small vocal minority at the expense of the majority.”106 Following the Release, 
two groups affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce107 submitted comment 
letters that claimed that the Release would “[i]ncrease the frequency and ease of 
proxy fights for dissident shareholders” and “[f]avor activist investors over rank-
and-file shareholders and other corporate constituencies.”108 These arguments do 
not controvert proponents’ argument about the expressive effects of universal 
proxies on how shareholders may vote. Instead, they focus on a different level 
of the effect of corporate voting rules and contested elections. They seem 
predicated on an (unstated) argument that increasing the likelihood of proxy 
contests will reduce the value of corporations—the fourth level of the effects of 
corporate voting described in Section I.0 above. 
 
from R. Bruce Josten, Exec. Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Chairman Thad Cochran and 
Vice Chairwoman Barbara Mikulski (June 15, 2016), 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/160615_fy17financialservicesgeneralgov
ernmentappropriations_cochran_mikulski.pdf [http://perma.cc/DB62-M9V6] (same). 
 103.   H.R. 5485, 114th Cong. § 1215 (2016). 
 104.   See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 845 (2017). 
 105.   See U.S. H.R. Comm. on Appropriations, Draft Financial Services and General 
Government Appropriations Act, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES § 932 (June 28, 2017, 10:54 AM), http://
appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/bills-115hr-sc-ap-fy2018-fservices-financialservicesandgeneral
government.pdf [http://perma.cc/YLY6-YH38]. 
 106.   Letter from Quaadman, supra note 17, at 3-4 (“Proxy contests are significantly 
disruptive to public companies, often to the ultimate detriment of their investors.” (citation omitted)); see 
also 162 CONG. REC. H4,500 (daily ed. July 7, 2016) (statement of Rep. Garrett) (“[U]niversal proxy 
ballots are a means for special interest groups to easily then nominate their preferred candidates to a 
company’s board . . . . The adoption of the universal proxy rule would only increase the likelihood of high 
profile proxy fights at public companies, which would then serve to distract the employees and 
management of these companies from carrying out their core mission.”). 
 107.   The Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness and the 
Corporate Coalition for Investor Value is a group formed by the Chamber of Commerce shortly after 
Chair White announced that the SEC would consider a universal proxy rule. See Alexis Leondis & Miles 
Weiss, U.S. Chamber Forms Coalition To Fend Off Activist Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-02/u-s-chamber-forms-coalition-to-fend-off-activist-
hedge-funds [http://perma.cc/GX52-MD34].  
 108.   See Letter from Corp. Governance Coal. for Inv’r Value to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-16/s72416-1471280-
130424.pdf [http://perma.cc/4H5C-RW4U]; Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for 
Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Jan. 9, 2017), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-16/s72416-1471278-130423.pdf [http://perma.cc/KX5P-WMFE]. 
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After much deliberation, and despite the House bills, a proposed rule was 
released on October 26, 2016.109 The Release indicated that the purpose of the 
proposed rule is “to ensure that shareholders using the proxy process are able to 
fully and consistently exercise . . . ‘fair corporate suffrage,’” by allowing them 
to fully exercise their voting rights.110 The Release aimed to do this by 
“replicating the vote that could be achieved at a shareholder meeting,”111 which 
the Release effectuates by permitting and requiring universal proxies. 
The Release proposes changes to Rule 14a-4(d) that would eliminate the 
short slate rule and modify the bona fide nominee rule such that any person who 
has consented to be named in a proxy statement would be a bona fide nominee,112 
thereby permitting either party to include on their proxy any opposing nominee 
that has consented to be nominated by the opposing side, without requiring the 
party to obtain consent. However, the Release goes further, and proposes a new 
rule, Rule 14a-19, that would require management and dissidents to use 
universal proxy cards in contested elections.113 A dissident would be required to 
give notice of the dissidents’ nominees to the corporation,114 file a definitive 
 
 109.    Exchange Act Release No. 34-79164, 81 Fed. Reg. 79,122, 79,122 (Nov. 10, 
2016).  See also Open Meeting (Webcast), SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/video/webcast-archive-player.shtml?document_id=102616openmeeting 
[https://perma.cc/GJ97-823Q]. 
 110.    81 Fed. Reg. at 79,124.  
 111.   Id. Replicating by proxy how shareholders could vote if they attended the 
shareholder meeting was the rationale for universal proxies put forth in most of the calls for consideration 
of a universal proxy rule. See Letter from Davis, supra note 15, at 2 (“[T]he Commission’s current proxy 
rules impede shareholders’ state law voting rights in proxy contests.”); Inv’r Advisory Comm., supra note 
50, at 1 (“[R]etail investors and institutional investors other than the largest in the U.S. do not have the 
practical ability to vote their shares at shareholder meetings in the same manner that is available to 
shareholders who attend shareholder meetings in person.”). In advance of the rule, Chair White stated that 
“the fundamental concept [is] that our proxy system should allow shareholders to do through the use of a 
proxy ballot what they can do in person at a shareholders’ meeting.” White, supra note 100. 
One comment letter on the Release has picked up on the rationale that “‘fair corporate suffrage,’ . . . is 
most appropriately served by ‘replicating the vote that could be achieved at a shareholder meeting’” to 
claim that “[a] rule instituting universal proxies would likely exceed the Commission’s existing powers 
under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act” and “would also be vulnerable to challenge under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.” See Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Jan. 4, 2017) (alteration omitted), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-
16/s72416-1459123-130241.pdf [http://perma.cc/PV7D-GS95]. However, this seems to mistake 
replication of the shareholder meeting for the end purpose of the rule, whereas the Release makes clear 
that its purpose is “to ensure “fair corporate suffrage,” 81 Fed. Reg. at 79,124, and, since shareholders 
have greater voting rights at the shareholder meeting, that is the measure of how proxy voting rights can 
be improved in order to improve suffrage and protect investors. 
 112.   See 81 Fed. Reg. at 79,184 (proposing new language for § 240.14a-4(d)(1)(i): “A 
person shall not be deemed to be a bona fide nominee and shall not be named as such unless the person 
has consented to being named in a proxy statement relating to the registrant’s next annual meeting . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). The rule changes would not apply to registered investment companies or business 
development companies, which would continue to require consent for inclusion of nominees on their 
proxy cards and continue to be subject to the short slate rules. See id. at 79,184-85. 
 113.   See id. at 79,185-86 (proposing § 240.14a-19: “Solicitation of proxies in support 
of director nominees other than the registrant’s nominees”). 
 114.   See id. (proposed § 240.14a-19(a)(1), 19(b)). 
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proxy statement by a set time,115 and solicit holders of a majority of the voting 
power of shares entitled to vote on the nominees.116 Both the dissident and 
management would then be required to use a universal proxy card that set forth 
both parties’ nominees, identified and grouped by management or dissident, 
listed alphabetically within the group with the same font for all nominees.117 
The change in control of the SEC under the Trump administration suggests 
that this opposition will prevent the adoption of a universal proxy rule.118 
However, the widespread investor support for universal proxies has led 
commentators to predict that, even if a universal proxies rule is not implemented, 
shareholder pressure will lead to corporations adopting universal proxies by 
private ordering.119 
* * * 
Neither advocates nor opponents of universal proxies puts forward any 
evidence regarding the higher-level effects of universal proxies, starting with the 
effects on proxy contest outcomes.120 The very limited history of universal 
proxies at U.S. corporations provides very little basis to draw inferences about 
those effects. Part II puts forward a conceptual framework for understanding the 
effects of universal proxies on proxy contest outcomes. Part III provides 
evidence of the incidence of these effects and draws reasonable inferences 
regarding the effects of universal proxies on future proxy contests. 
II. Distortions in Proxy Contests 
This Part puts forward a conceptual framework regarding the effects of the 
current proxy voting rules and universal proxies. The current proxy voting rules 
create the potential for distorted proxy contest outcomes.121 Universal proxies 
 
 115.   See id. (proposed § 240.14a-19(a)(2)). 
 116.   Exchange Act Release No. 34-79164, 81 Fed. Reg. 79,122, 79,185 (Nov. 10, 2016)  
(proposed § 240.14a-19(a)(3)). 
 117.   See id. at 79,186 (proposed § 240.14a-19(e)). The proposed rules would not apply 
to consent solicitation, or solicitations for registered investment companies or business development 
companies. See id. at 79,185 (proposed § 240.14a-19(g)). 
 118.   See Ronald Orol, Why Team Trump Will Probably Kill SEC Rule Reshaping Proxy 
Fights, THESTREET (Nov. 22, 2016, 2:15 PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/13903049/1/why-team-
trump-will-probably-kill-sec-rule-reshaping-proxy-fights.html [http://perma.cc/EVR9-R36T]. 
 119.   See Before the Board, A Davis Polk Podcast on Corporate Governance, Episode 
4: Universal Proxy, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Jan. 9, 2017), 
http://www.davispolk.com/publications/podcast-before-board-corporate-governance-universal-proxy 
[http://perma.cc/V7MD-LTWZ] (“Companies will see, at some point, shareholder proponents asking 
companies to implement universal proxies through the shareholder proposal process.”). 
 120.   Indeed, in her speech announcing that the SEC would consider a universal proxy 
rule proposal, Chair White acknowledge that panelists at the SEC’s roundtable had “differed on whether 
the adoption of a universal proxy ballot would increase or decrease shareholder activism or otherwise 
impact the outcome of election contests.” White, supra note 100. 
 121.   Phrased in the terms of the social choice literature, in some cases the restriction in 
the “range” of voting imposed by the current proxy system may thwart the selection of a “Condorcet 
winner” of the director election—the set of nominees that would be preferred by a plurality of votes in 
pairwise comparisons among sets of nominees. The range restriction may also prevent the revelation of a 
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would eliminate these distortions. Distorted proxy contests may be of two types. 
First, there may be a distorted choice between nominees on different sides. 
Second, there may be a distorted choice of nominees within sides, either among 
management nominees, or among dissident nominees. Each type of distorted 
proxy contest could result in either management or dissident nominees being 
elected, depending on the circumstances, and the two types of distorted proxy 
contest could both occur in the same election. This Part considers each of these 
types of distorted proxy contest, using case studies that illustrate each type of 
distorted proxy contest. 
A. Distortions Between Sides 
The first kind of distorted contest involves distorted choices between 
nominees on different sides, whereby a management nominee may be elected in 
place of a dissident nominee, or a dissident nominee in place of a management 
nominee. 
Consider an annual meeting of a corporation for which there are two 
incumbent (management) nominees up for election, Mary and Nathan. A 
dissident shareholder, such as a hedge fund activist, nominates two director 
nominees, David and Elizabeth. Consider that the company has one hundred 
shares, which are held by four groups of shareholders.122 Loyalist shareholders 
hold forty shares; they prefer management’s nominees. They vote on the 
management proxy card, for Mary and Nathan. Reformer shareholders hold 
thirty shares and prefer the dissident’s nominees. They vote on the dissident 
proxy card for David and Emily. A third group of “splitting” shareholders hold 
thirty shares. Each would prefer that Mary and David be elected, rather than 
either Emily or Nathan. If the shareholders were not constrained in how they 
could vote—for instance, if all of them attended the shareholder meeting in 
person—then Mary and David would be elected, with the results as shown in 
Figure 3(a) below. 
 
“cycle” among the preferences of voters, where shareholders with a plurality of votes prefer, for instance, 
the set of nominees A to set B; set B to set C; but set C to set A (that is, their collective preferences are 
“intransitive”). 
 122.   In most large public corporations, shares will be held by many different 
shareholders. The analogy to this example would be the group of shareholders that prefers to vote with 
management, the group that prefers to vote with the dissident, and the group that prefers to split their votes 
between management and the dissident. 
Universal Proxies 
32 
Figure 3(a). Unconstrained Vote 
Results 
 Figure 3(b). Distortion Between Sides 
from Proxy Voting 
 
However, as described in Part I, shareholders do not attend annual 
meetings, and instead vote by proxy. The group that would like to split their vote 
are unable to do so because of the proxy voting rules. They are forced to choose 
between one of the two side’s proxy cards. Assume that twenty-five vote on the 
management card, for Mary, withholding from Nathan, and five vote on the 
dissident card, voting for David, and withholding from Emily. The results would 
be as shown in Figure 3(b). Nathan would be elected rather than David. The 
proxy voting system results in a distortion in the contest outcome, with a 
different nominee—Nathan—being elected than the nominee—David—that a 
plurality of shareholders would have preferred. 
In this case, the distorted outcome favored a management nominee, because 
the third group of shareholders would have preferred to vote for a dissident and 
weren’t able to because they voted on the management proxy card. However, the 
distorted outcome could also favor dissident nominees, if shareholders vote on 
the dissident card and withhold enough votes that would have resulted in the 
election of a management nominee. 
Distorted proxy contests will result from the current proxy voting system 
where shareholders voting on a one-sided card would prefer to vote for a 
nominee not included on the card. If this is the case, the only option they have is 
to withhold from nominees on the card they are voting on, instead of voting for 
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considered in determining the result of the election. Put another way, a 
nominee’s election or nonelection may be a distorted outcome, depending on the 
number of votes withheld on each card. The current proxy voting system will 
result in the distorted choice of a nominee A over a nominee B that shareholders 
in the aggregate would have preferred, where the number of votes for A plus the 
number of votes withheld from opposing nominees that would have gone to A is 
greater than the number of votes for B plus the number of votes withheld from 
opposing nominees that would have gone to B. 
The distorted outcome that is most likely is that the last-elected nominee 
would be replaced by the first nonelected nominee, although it is also possible 
that there may be more than one distorted choice in the same election, e.g., the 
second-last elected and last elected nominees, may be elected over the first 
nonelected and second nonelected nominees that shareholders prefer. 
The current proxy system will result in a distorted choice between sides if 
a management nominee was elected over a dissident nominee, even though the 
sum of the for and withhold votes that would have gone to the dissident nominee 
is greater than the sum of the for and withhold votes that would have gone to the 
management nominee, and vice versa for the distorted election of a dissident 
nominee over a management nominee. 
One example of a distorted choice between sides was in the proxy contest 
at the 2009 annual meeting of Biogen Idec Inc. At the time of the meeting, the 
corporation had a classified board with thirteen directors, four of whom were up 
for election at the 2009 annual meeting.123 Hedge fund activist Carl Icahn 
nominated four directors for election to fill the four available positions: 
Alexander Denner, Richard Mulligan, David Sidransky, and Thomas Deuel.124 
Proxy advisor125 ISS recommended that shareholders vote on the Icahn card, for 
Icahn nominees Denner and Mulligan.126 Table 2, below, shows the for, 
withheld, and total votes cast for each management (“M”) or Icahn (“D”) 
nominee (in millions of votes), with the nominees ranked by votes cast for.127 
The nominees elected are those ranked one to four. 
 
 123.   Biogen Idec Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 6 (Apr. 27, 2009). 
 124.   Icahn Partners LP, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (May 15, 2009). 
 125.   Proxy advisors provide information to institutional investors about corporate 
elections, and recommendations regarding how those investors should vote. See Stephen Choi et al., The 
Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 870 (2010) 
 126.   Icahn Partners LP, Press Release Filed as Exhibit to Definitive Additional 
Materials (Schedule 14A) (May 28, 2009). 
 127.   Biogen Idec Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 16, 2009). 
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Table 2: Biogen Idec 2009 Election Results (millions)128 
Nominee Side For WH Total Rank Elected 
For+ 
Avg.WH 
New Rank Elected 
Alexander Denner D 139.0 4.1 143.1 1  144.4 2  
Robert Pangia M 116.6 3.7 120.3 2  144.5 1  
William Young M 115.9 4.4 120.3 3  143.8 3  
Richard Mulligan D 114.3 7.2 121.5 4  119.7 5  
Alan Glassberg M 112.4 2.6 115.0 5  140.2 4  
Lawrence Best M 82.5 10.9 93.4 6  110.3 6  
David Sidransky D 67.4 48.8 116.2 7  72.8 7  
Thomas Deuel D 64.9 51.3 116.2 8  70.3 8  
Avg. Mgmt.  106.8 5.4 112.3      
Avg. Diss.  96.4 27.8 124.3      
 
As Table 2 shows, two management nominees, Robert Pangia and William 
Young, were elected, together with Icahn nominees Alexander Denner and 
Richard Mulligan. Mulligan was the last nominee elected, and management 
nominee Alan Glassberg was the first nominee not elected, with 1.9 million votes 
fewer than Mulligan.129 
The number of votes withheld from the candidates varied significantly. On 
the dissident card, an average of 27.8 million votes were withheld from the four 
dissident nominees. On the management card, many fewer votes were 
withheld—an average of 5.4 million votes. 
Let us assume that shareholders withholding on the management card 
would have preferred voting for dissident nominees to withholding against 
management nominees, and vice versa for shareholders withholding votes on the 
dissident card. Let us further assume that shareholder preferences are evenly split 
among which nominee on the other card they would have voted for, had they the 
opportunity. These assumptions are analyzed in greater depth in Part III. In each 
case, those shareholders were unable to vote as they would have preferred 
because they voted on one-sided proxies. Had they instead voted at the annual 
meeting, or on a universal proxy, each nominee would have also received the 
average number of votes withheld on the opposite card, so the results would have 
been as set out in the “For+Avg. WH” column of Table 2, and the ranking of 
nominees by for votes would have been as set out in the “New Rank” column. 
 
 128.   Id. 
 129.   Consideration of the total votes cast suggests that 93.4 million shares (39% of the 
total voted) were voted on the management proxy card, 116.2 million shares were voted on the Icahn 
proxy card (49% of the total voted), and 26.9 million shares (11% of the total voted) must have voted by 
legal proxy at the meeting. Of the 26.9 million shares, 5.3 million for two management and two dissident 
nominees (Pangia, Young, Denner, and Mulligan) and 21.6 million for three management and one 
dissident nominee (Pangia, Young, Glassberg, and Denner). Id. 
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Management nominee Glassberg would have received more votes than Icahn 
nominee Mulligan and would have been elected in his place.130 
B. Distortions within Sides 
The second kind of distorted proxy contest involves a distorted choice of 
nominees among those nominated by one side, either among the management 
nominees, or the dissident nominees. That is, a management nominee that 
shareholders prefer less may be elected in place of another management nominee 
that they prefer more, or a dissident nominee that shareholders prefer less may 
be elected in place of another dissident nominee that they prefer more. This may 
take place anytime that at least one nominee is elected from each side. 
Consider the example above, but assume that twenty-five shares of the 
splitting group prefer Mary and David, and five prefer Nathan and David. Were 
all of the shareholders to vote at the annual meeting, the results would be as 
shown in Figure 4(a) below. Nathan and David would be elected.131 
 
 130.   The presence of a Mulligan rather than Glassberg on the Board of Directors may 
have facilitated subsequent changes in the management of Biogen. Six months after the annual meeting, 
Biogen announced that its President and Chief Executive Officer, James C. Mullen, would retire. Biogen 
Idec Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 4, 2010). 
 131.   For a similar example, see Whissel, supra note 91. 
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Figure 4(a). Unconstrained Vote 
Results 
 Figure 4(b). Distortion Within Sides 
from Proxy Voting 
 
 
However, if the shareholders all vote by proxy, the splitting groups will be 
forced to decide between voting on the management and the dissident proxy 
cards. If the twenty-five that prefer Mary and David vote on the dissident proxy 
card, for David (withholding from Emily), and the five that prefer Nathan and 
David vote on the management card, for Nathan (withholding from Mary), the 
results will be as shown in Figure 4(b). Nathan and David would be elected. 
Nathan’s election represents a distortion in the contest outcome within sides, as 
a plurality of shareholders would have preferred that Mary be elected. 
This could also occur in combination with the distorted choice between 
sides described in Section II.A—there may be a distorted choice between 
dissident and management nominees, and the wrong nominees may be among 
either group. A distortion within a side is an instance of the general situation 
where there is distorted election of nominee A over nominee B, except that in 
this case both A and B are from the same side. 
The potential for a distorted choice within a side can be seen in the case of 
the 2015 proxy contest at Rovi Corporation. Rovi is the maker of the TV guides 
that appear on cable boxes and allow viewers to select shows; it has since 
acquired TiVo Inc. and taken on TiVo’s name.132 In 2015, Rovi had seven 
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directors, all of whom were up for election at the 2015 annual meeting.133 An 
activist investor, Engaged Capital LLC, led by Glenn Welling, nominated three 
directors, Raghavendra Rau, David Lockwood, and Welling himself.134 The 
Engaged Capital proxy card indicated that it would withhold from management 
nominees other than Alan Earhart, Ruthann Quindlen, Thomas Carson, and 
Steven Lucas.135 ISS recommended that shareholders vote on the Engaged 
Capital proxy card for dissident nominees Rau and Welling, and withhold from 
dissident nominee Lockwood.136 The results of the election are set out in Table 
3, below (in millions of votes). 
Table 3: Rovi Corporation 2015 Election Results (millions)137 
Nominee M/D For WH Elected Behind JM % of DL WH 
Alan Earhart M 74.2 7.1    
Ruthann Quindlen M 74.2 7.1    
Thomas Carson M 74.1 7.2    
Steven Lucas M 74.1 7.2    
Raghavendra Rau D 47.4 0.9    
Glenn Welling D 43.1 5.2    
James Meyer M 33.8 0.2    
James O’Shaughnessy M 30.9 3.1  2.9 6.9% 
Andrew Ludwick M 27.0 7.0    
David Lockwood D 5.4 42.0    
The four unopposed management nominees were elected, followed by two 
of the three Engaged Capital nominees, Rau and Welling, and one of the 
management nominees opposed by the dissidents, James Meyer. The nominees 
with the most for votes of those not elected were management nominees James 
O’Shaughnessy and Andrew Ludwick, with O’Shaughnessy receiving 2.9 
million fewer for votes than Meyer (8% of shares voting on the management 
card), and Ludwick receiving 6.8 million fewer for votes than Meyer (20% of 
shares voting on the management card). Compared to the number of votes 
withheld on the dissident card, these numbers are very small—the margin 
between Meyer and O’Shaughnessy is only 6.9% of the forty-two million total 
withheld from one dissident nominee, David Lockwood. That is, had 6% of the 
votes withheld from David Lockwood represented shareholders who preferred 
 
 133.   Rovi Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A) (Apr. 13, 2015). 
 134.   Engaged Capital, LLC, Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 13, 
2015). 
 135.   Id. 
 136.   Engaged Capital, LLC, Press Release, Filed as Exhibit to Definitive Additional 
Materials (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 28, 2015). 
 137.   Rovi Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 19, 2015). 
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O’Shaughnessy to Meyer, then if those shareholders had been able to vote for 
their preferred candidate, O’Shaughnessy would have been elected in place of 
Meyer.138 While the preferences shareholders voting on the dissident card would 
have among Meyer, O’Shaughessy and Ludwick cannot be known, there is some 
reason to suggest that shareholders may have preferred O’Shaughnessy or 
Ludwick to Meyer,139 and that O’Shaughnessy’s qualifications would have made 
him well-suited to handle particular issues that Rovi later faced.140 
III. The Incidence of Distorted Proxy Contests 
This Part describes an empirical analysis to determine the number of proxy 
contests likely to have been distorted by the current restrictions on proxies and 
the number of contests which could have had different outcomes had universal 
proxies been used. Section III.A describes the data used to perform this analysis. 
Sections III.B and III.C presents the methodology for determining the expected 
and maximum numbers of distortions, respectively, and the results of these 
analyses. Section III.D considers factors associated with distorted proxy 
contests. Section III.E considers the assumptions on which this analysis is based. 
A. Data on Recent Proxy Contests 
To analyze the incidence of distorted proxy contests, I gather data on proxy 
contests between 2001 and December 2016. I use SharkRepellent data to identify 
all proxy contests during that period at U.S. corporations that sought board 
representation and were voted on.141 
SharkRepellent also provides data on contest-specific information, 
including the nominees for election, and whether they were elected. I gather the 
 
 138.   Of course, this assumes that no shareholders withholding votes on the dissident 
card would have voted for Meyer. To the extent shareholders withholding from dissidents had voted for 
Meyer, O’Shaughnessy would have had to receive more votes than Meyer in an amount equal to 18% of 
the votes withheld on the dissident card. 
 139.   At the two uncontested annual meetings preceding the proxy contest, 
O’Shaughnessy and Ludwick received more for votes than Meyer. Ludwick was also the sitting chairman 
of the board of the corporation, which may have led some shareholders to prefer him to Meyer. On the 
other hand, since shareholders voting on the dissident card are likely to have been unhappy with the 
performance of the corporation, they may also have been happy with him not being elected. 
 140.   O’Shaughnessy had a background as intellectual property counsel and had been a 
consultant on intangible assets. Rovi’s 2015 proxy statement stated that his “experience in the field of 
patent law is integral to the company and its business and helps provide strategic guidance to the company 
and the Board of Directors.” Rovi Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 11 (Apr. 13, 2015). 
After the election, the board was left without any intellectual property experts, even though intellectual 
property licensing generated 54% of the company’s total revenue in 2016. TiVo Corporation, Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Feb. 27, 2018). To protect its intellectual property, the company filed litigation 
against competitor Comcast for patent infringement in April 2016, id. at 25), which resulted in lengthy 
litigation. See Connor Tweardy, TiVo v. Comcast: TiVo Files New Round of Patent Infringement Actions 
Against Comcast, HARV. J.L. & TECH. (Feb. 10, 2018), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/tivo-v-comcast-
tivo-files-new-round-of-patent-litigation-against-comcast [https://perma.cc/S6J8-G59C]. 
 141.   For more information, see supra note 32. 
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number of votes for and withheld for each nominee from a combination of 
SharkRepellent, ISS Voting Analytics, and manual collection from the SEC’s 
EDGAR database. SharkRepellent includes vote results for corporations in the 
Russell 3000 Index for meetings from 2008 onwards. ISS Voting Analytics 
includes vote results for a similar set of corporations from 2003 onwards, which 
I use for meetings from 2003 to 2007. I manually collect vote results for meetings 
prior to 2003, for corporations outside the Russell 3000, and where vote results 
are otherwise not included in the SharkRepellent or ISS databases. I also check 
any apparent anomalies in the SharkRepellent and ISS voting results and correct 
them where necessary. 
From 2001 to 2016, SharkRepellent identifies completed proxy contests at 
452 meetings.142 I exclude those that do not represent bona fide proxy contests. 
A number of contests in the sample involved written consent solicitations143 or 
solicitations for special meetings.144 I exclude these from the sample since none 
of these involved direct decisions among two sets of nominees. I also exclude 
contests at which no director election was voted on, and meetings that do not 
appear to have involved a real contest by a dissident.145 These exclusions leave 
354 bona fide proxy contests at 297 corporations. 
Second, I exclude from the sample bona fide proxy contests that can’t be 
analyzed using my methodology. For sixty contested meetings the corporation 
failed to release the voting results for all candidates. In most cases, these 
corporations only released information for the nominees that were elected, and 
not for the nominees that were not elected.146 I also exclude the twenty-five 
 
 142.   At four meetings, two different dissidents put forward nominees. Two of these four 
contested meetings were excluded for other reasons; one I excluded since there were three different 
dissident cards. At the fourth meeting, involvingAmylin Pharmaceuticals, the two dissidents agreed to 
combine their nominees onto one card, which I consider as one contest. 
 143.   Five contests in the initial sample were solicitations by written consent, whereby 
a dissident solicited consents from shareholders to remove existing directors and elect new directors. In 
this case, the main contest was a plebiscite on the preliminary matter of whether to remove the directors, 
and—on the same written consent—whether to replace them with a slate of directors chosen by the 
dissident. 
 144.   Two contests involved special meetings called by a dissident to vote on a proposal 
to remove directors and to appoint a slate put forward by the dissident. 
 145.   These were contests at the American Express Corporation, at each annual meeting 
from 2010 to 2013, and involved a disgruntled former employee, Peter Lindner, who purported to put 
himself forward as a nominee for election to the board. See Am. Express Corp., Definitive Proxy 
Statement (Schedule 14A), at 73 (Mar. 8, 2013). In none of the years did Lindner file a definitive proxy 
statement or solicit proxy materials, and in no year did he receive more than 11 votes (out of more than 
900 million votes cast at the meeting), corresponding to the 11 shares he himself owned of record. See, 
e.g., Am. Express Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 75 (May 1, 2009). 
 146.   These were the 2015 proxy contest at Myers Industries, Inc., the 2009 proxy 
contest at Trico Marine Services, Inc., the 2008 proxy contest at Rackable Systems, Inc. (now known as 
Silicon Graphics International Corp.), and the 2014 proxy contest at GrafTech International Ltd. In each 
of these instances, the corporation only provided voting results for the nominees that were elected to the 
board and failed to provide results for those that were not elected, in apparent violation of the requirements 
of Item 5.07(b) of Form 8-K (requiring disclosure of “a separate tabulation for each nominee for election 
to office). See GrafTech Int’l Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 21, 2014); Myers Indus., Inc., Current 
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contested meetings for corporations that permit cumulative voting, whereby a 
shareholder can choose to cumulate their aggregate votes on fewer nominees. 
Cumulative voting prevents application of the analyses and distributional 
assumptions I use below.147 Excluding these contests leaves a total of 269 
contests at 229 corporations. Table 4 shows the number of bona fide contests, 
those that took place at companies in the Russell 3000 Index, and those that are 
included in my sample, for 2001 to 2016. Table 4 also shows the proportion of 
all listed companies148 that had bona fide proxy contests in that year, and the 
proportion of companies in the Russell 3000 Index.149 
Table 4: Bona Fide Contest and Contests in Sample, 2001-2016 
Year 
Bona Fide 
Contests Russell 3000 Bona Fide Contests Contests in Sample 
 n % n % All R3000 
2001 25 0.4% 5 0.2% 18 5 
2002 23 0.4% 2 0.1% 17 1 
2003 23 0.4% 6 0.2% 17 4 
2004 12 0.2% 1 0.0% 7 0 
2005 8 0.2% 4 0.1% 5 3 
2006 27 0.5% 9 0.3% 19 6 
2007 21 0.4% 4 0.1% 15 3 
2008 35 0.8% 12 0.4% 23 11 
2009 31 0.7% 14 0.5% 28 13 
2010 21 0.5% 6 0.2% 18 6 
2011 15 0.4% 8 0.3% 9 5 
2012 20 0.5% 8 0.3% 15 7 
2013 24 0.6% 12 0.4% 20 11 
2014 24 0.5% 15 0.5% 19 13 
2015 20 0.5% 10 0.3% 17 9 
2016 25 0.6% 11 0.4% 22 10 
Total 354  127  269 107 
Avg. 22.1 0.5% 7.9 0.3% 16.8 6.7 
 
 
Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 30, 2015); Trico Marine Servs., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 10, 
2009). 
 147.   For example, if a shareholder held 100 shares, and there were 10 board seats up 
for election, instead of voting a maximum of 100 votes for any single nominee, the shareholder could 
cumulate all of the 1,000 votes to which it is entitled on a single candidate, or split those votes between 
multiple candidates as it wished. 
 148.   The number of listed companies in each year is taken from the World Federation 
of Exchanges, published by the World Bank. Listed Domestic Companies, Total, WORLD BANK,  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?view=chart [https://perma.cc/7L47-75LV]. 
 149.   The number of companies in the Russell 3000 Index is taken as of December 31 
of each year, from data provided to the author by FTSE Russell (correspondence and data on file with 
author). The number varies, because of delistings and spin-offs, from 2,906 companies in December 2001, 
to 3,054 companies in December 2014. 
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Table 4 shows that the number of bona fide proxy contests per year varies 
from eight to thirty-five, which represents between 0.2% to 0.8% of listed 
companies each year. The numbers and proportions for Russell 3000 companies 
are even smaller, from one contest in 2004 to fifteen in 2015, representing 
between 0.03% and 0.5% of Russell 3000 companies in each year. As the 
difference between these numbers shows, a significant number of the proxy 
contests that take place each year are at very small corporations that are not part 
of the Russell 3000.150 However, according to my data, these corporations make 
up less than 1% of the total market capitalization of U.S. public corporations in 
the relevant years.151 While my sample includes proxy contests at these 
“microcap” companies, I pay particular attention to contests at corporations in 
the Russell 3000, as they represent the overwhelming proportion of equity 
invested in U.S. public corporations. 
For each proxy contest in the sample, I gather the voting results for each 
nominee from the SharkRepellent database, including the number of shares that 
voted for, withheld,152 and abstained from voting. I examine each of the cases 
where abstain votes were listed in the data, as Rule 14a-4 generally does not 
provide for an option to abstain on director nominations; in most cases these are 
not significant in number, and I reclassify these as withholds.153 I also exclude 
nominees that were not voted on, for instance, where the election of a particular 
director was contingent on another proposal (e.g., increasing the size of the 
board) and that prior proposal failed. I conduct spot checks of the data for a 
number of contests, comparing it to SEC filings containing the definitive proxy 
cards and election results, and correct any obvious errors or omissions. 
B. Methodology for Identifying Expected Distortions in Proxy Contests 
My approach to determine which proxy contests can be expected to have 
had their outcomes distorted by the current proxy system follows the intuition 
developed in Part II. Assuming that the for votes remain the same regardless of 
the voting system,154 the election of a nominee can be expected to have been 
distorted if another (nonelected) nominee would have been elected in their place, 
 
 150.   These are corporations with market capitalizations below approximately $100 
million, which was the cutoff for inclusion in the Russell 3000 Index in these years. 
 151.   Cf. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 1347, 1369 (2011) (“[M]icro-cap companies . . . account for less than 2.5% of the market 
capitalization of U.S. companies.”). 
 152.   SharkRepellent refers to these as votes “against,” however in most cases this is 
inaccurate, as Rule 14a-4 requires proxy cards on director elections to include options to vote for and 
withhold, and only against in the event that state law permits votes to be cast against a nominee. See supra 
note 32.  
 153.   The voting results of the 2008 proxy contest at Grubb & Ellis Company list 
implausibly high levels of abstentions for each nominee, apparently recording shares voted on the 
opposing card, and therefore not voted for a particular nominee, as abstain votes for those nominees. This 
appears to be an error on the part of the corporation, and I disregard these abstentions. 
 154.   I consider the validity of this assumption in depth in infra Section III.E. 
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if shareholders withholding votes because they were unable to mix and match 
had instead been permitted to vote for nominees on another card. This would 
have been the case had the difference in those withhold votes going to the 
nonelected nominee over the elected nominee been large enough to overcome 
the gap in for votes between the elected and nonelected nominees under the 
current proxy system.155 This is likely to be a function of how close nonelected 
nominees were to being elected and how many votes were withheld on each side. 
Figure 5 shows the number of meetings with different levels of votes 
withheld as a percentage of the average number of shares voted or withheld per 
board seat up for election. 
 Figure 5: Percentage of Total Votes Withheld  
 
As Figure 5 shows, most meetings had very few withhold votes—the 
median proportion of total votes withheld is 2.55%. However, thirty meetings 
(11%) had more than 10% of total votes withheld, and seventy-four (28%) had 
more than 5% of total votes withheld. Figure 6, below, shows the distribution of 
proxy contests by narrowness of margin—the percentage increase in for votes 
that would have been necessary for the first nonelected nominee to have 
overtaken the last-elected nominee. 
 
 155.   A distortion can be expected if a nominee, e, was elected and another nominee, n, 
was not elected, and the “for” votes received by each nominee f, and redistributed withhold votes, r, that 
each nominee would have received if shareholder had been able to vote for any nominee they preferred, 
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Figure 6: Minimum Percentage Difference in for Votes  
 
As Figure 6 shows, most contests were not very close. The median 
difference between the number of for votes for the last-elected nominee and the 
first not-elected nominees was 23.1% of the votes cast per seat. However, a 
reasonable number of the contests were close or very close. At forty-eight 
contests (17.8%), the difference was less than 5%. The likelihood of distortions 
from the current proxy voting rules can be expected to be greater at the 
intersection of these groups: close elections with a significant number of 
withhold votes. 
If investors that withheld votes were instead able to vote for nominees on 
the other side rather than withholding, which nominee would they vote for? 
Given the impossibility of determining this question, I make conservative 
assumptions about how investors would vote.156 First, I assume that investors 
who could vote on the other card would choose randomly which nominees to 
vote for on that card (uniform distribution). As a result, if there are n opposed 
nominees on the new card that the investor could vote for,157 I assume that each 





 156.   Pershing Square used a similar approach of assuming that shareholders 
withholding votes would prefer to vote on the other card in evaluating how close their nominee, Bill 
Ackman, was to being elected in their contest at ADP. However, in that case, Pershing Square 
questionably assumed that all of the votes withheld against a particular management nominee, Eric Fast, 
would have gone to Bill Ackman if a universal proxy had been used. Pershing Square Comments on 
Today’s ADP Election Results, BUSINESS WIRE (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171107006255/en/Pershing-Square-Comments-
Today%E2%80%99s-ADP-Election-Results [https://perma.cc/V2XG-PABN]. 
 157.   I consider only nominees that are “opposed.” All dissidents are opposed, but if 
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In reality, investors are likely to have some ranking of preference among 
the nominees.158 Given that investors who would be voting on a particular card 
may share similar criteria and approaches to assessing candidates, it is also 
reasonable to assume that the nominees that investors switching to a card are 
likely to prefer may be the same nominees that the investors already voting on 
that card prefer. I therefore also consider a second distribution model whereby 
withhold votes are distributed among opposing nominees in the same proportion 
as the for votes of investors that actually voted on that card (proportional 
distribution). 
I calculate the total votes withheld from opposed management159 nominees 
and from dissident nominees and divide this by the number of opposed nominees 
on the other side that the shareholder could have voted for if they had the 
opportunity. I then add this number of withhold votes to the total for votes 
received by each nominee to generate the expected undistorted for vote for each 
nominee. I recalculate nominees’ rankings according to the new total and 
determine which nominees would have been elected.160 The outcome of the 
proxy contest is expected to have been distorted if at least one nominee that was 
not elected would have been elected based on the new totals. 
For the proportional distribution model, I follow a similar approach, but 
instead add to each opposed nominee the total number of votes withheld on the 
opposing card, multiplied by the number of for votes received by that nominee 
as a proportion of all for votes cast for opposed nominees on that side. 
In both cases I do not distribute withholds received by unopposed 
nominees, and I do not distribute withhold votes to unopposed nominees. As 
described above, where a dissident uses a short slate and does not put forward 
nominees to oppose all management nominees, votes cast on the dissident proxy 
card can be voted in favor of unopposed management nominees. Unopposed 
management nominees therefore already receive votes from the dissident card, 
and these votes would not be affected by a universal proxy. 
C. The Likely Incidence of Distortions in Recent Proxy Contests 
Table 5 shows the contests that can be expected to have been distorted, 
based on the assumptions above. For each expected distorted contest, Table 5 
shows the number of management and dissident nominees actually elected, the 
number expected to have been elected without distortion, the nominees elected 
 
 158.   That is, choices are likely to not be random and choices of votes from different 
investors are unlikely to be independent of each other. 
 159.   I do not include votes withheld from unopposed management nominees, since the 
short slate rules permit shareholders voting on the dissident card to vote for these nominees. 
 160.   The expected undistorted for votes for each nominee i, E(fi), can be expressed 
algebraically as a function of the for votes (fi) received by the nominee and the withhold votes (wj) received 
by each of the n opposing nominees, j, such that:  E(fi) = fi +∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 . 
   n 
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that would not have been elected without distortion, and the nominees not elected 
that would have been elected without distortion. It also shows whether the 
distortion occurs under the uniform distributional assumption, the proportional 
distributional assumption, or both. The table is split into those proxy contests 
that took place at companies that were in the Russell 3000 Index at the time of 




Table 5. Expected Distorted Proxy Contests Outcomes, 2001-2016 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Company / Dissident, Year 
# M/D 
Elected 
























Panel 1: Russell 3000 Corporations 
Amylin Pharmaceuticals / 
Carl Icahn & Eastbourne 
Capital Mgmt., 2009 
10 / 2 11 / 1 M Behrens (D) Wilson (M) Both 
Benchmark Electronics / 
Engaged Capital, 2016 
6 / 2 7 / 1 M Gifford (D) Dawson (M) Both 
Biogen Idec Inc. / Carl Icahn, 
2009 
2 / 2 3 / 1 M Mulligan (D) Glassberg (M) Both 
CSX Corp. / TCI Fund 
Mgmt. and 3G Capital Mgmt., 
2008 






Datascope Corp. / Ramius 
Capital Group, 2007 
1 / 1 2 / 0 M Dantzker (D) Asmundson (M) Both 
Forest Laboratories / Carl 
Icahn, 2012 
9 / 1 10 / 0 M Legault (D) Goldwasser (M) Both 
International Game 
Technology / Ader 
Investment Mgmt., 2013 
7 / 1 8 / 0 M Silvers (D) Roberson (M) Both 
Mentor Graphics / Carl 
Icahn, 2011 
5 / 3 6 / 2 M Schechter (D) Fiebiger (M) Both 
ModusLink Global Solutions 
/ Peerless Systems Corp., 2012 
1 / 1 0 / 2 D Fenton (M) Brog (D) Uniform 
Rovi Corp. / Engaged Capital 
LLC, 2015 




Sensient Technologies / 
FrontFour Capital Group, 
2014 
9 / 0 8 / 1 D Whitelaw (M) Redmond (D) Both 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
































Panel 2: Non-Russell 3000 Corporations 
Benihana / Providence 
Recovery Partners, 2005 






California Micro Devices / 
Dialectic Capital Mgmt., 2009 
4 / 3 5 / 2 M Gullard (D) Meyercord (M) Prop. 
Crown Crafts, Inc. / 
Wynnefield Partners Small 
Cap Value, 2007 
2 / 1 3 / 0 M Wasserman (D) Fox (M) Both 
Del Global Technologies 
Corp. / Steel Partners, 2003 
1 / 4 1 / 4 - Smith (M) Brady (M) Both 
Fifth Street Senior Floating 
Rate Corp. / Ironsides 
Partners, 2016 
1 / 1 0 / 2 D Dimitrov (M) Knapp (D) Both 
IEC Electronics Corp. / 
Vintage Capital Mgmt. and 
Kahn Capital Mgmt., 2015 
0 / 7 1 / 6 M Schlarbaum (D) Hudson (M) Prop. 
Point Blank Solutions, Inc. / 
Steel Partners II, L.P., 2008 






Telkonet, Inc. / Peter Kross, 
2016 






Virtus Total Return Fund / 
Bulldog Investors, 2016 
1 / 0 0 / 1 D Mann (M) Dakos (D) Both 
 
Table 5 shows that eighteen contests can be expected to have been distorted 
assuming uniform distribution, and eighteen assuming proportional distribution. 
Sixteen of these contests can be expected to have been distorted under both 
models, suggesting that the approach is robust to the choice of distributional 
assumption. I henceforth focus on results assuming uniform distribution, unless 
otherwise stated. 
The eighteen distorted contests represent 6.7% of the contests in the 
sample. Eleven of the contests with switches are Russell 3000 companies (Panel 
1), representing 10.3% of the contests at Russell 3000 companies in the sample. 
The seven non-Russell 3000 companies distorted represent 4.3% of the non-
Russell 3000 companies in the sample, suggesting distortions may be more likely 
to occur at larger corporations. 
At two of these contests, at CSX Corporation and Benihana, Inc., two 
nominees would have been replaced by nominees from the other side. At most 
other contests, one nominee would likely have been replaced by another from 
the other side. At three of the non-Russell 3000 companies, the distortion is likely 
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to have occurred within the management side; if there were no distortion, a 
different management nominee would have been elected. 
Column (4) of Table 5 shows that, at ten out of the fifteen contests (67%) 
where there is likely to have been a distortion between sides, universal proxies 
could be expected to have favored management nominees, resulting in a 
management nominee replacing a dissident that was actually elected. At only 
five of the fifteen contests (33%) could universal proxies be expected to have 
assisted dissident nominees. The difference is even more pronounced for the 
eleven contests at Russell 3000 companies, at nine (81%) of which universal 
proxies would have favored management nominees. 
At six of the fifteen contests with distortions between sides (40%) a mix of 
dissident and management nominees were elected, and there would still have 
been a mix if the distortions were eliminated. At six other contests, a mix of 
management and dissident nominees were elected but had universal proxies been 
used, one side could have been expected to win all of the positions. At the 
remaining three contests (20%) management nominees were elected to all of the 
available seats, but had universal proxies been used, dissidents would have won 
one or more seats. 
D. The Maximum Bounds of Distortions in Recent Proxy Contests 
The analysis above is based on conservative assumptions and may therefore 
underestimate the number of distorted proxy contests. In order to evaluate the 
upper bound on the possible costs of a universal proxy rule, this section analyzes 
the maximum number of distorted proxy contest outcomes that may have 
occurred. 
Assuming that the number of for votes are fixed, it is possible to say when 
a nominee’s election could not have been distorted, and, by implication, when a 
contest could possibly have been distorted.161 A nominee’s election could not 
have been distorted if the difference in for votes for an unelected nominee to be 
elected is so great that even if the maximum number of withhold votes from the 
other side had been voted for that nominee, the nominee still would not have 
been elected. Conversely, an outcome may have been distorted if the difference 
in for votes between a nonelected nominee and the last-elected nominee is less 
than the maximum number of withhold votes that could have gone to that 
 
 161.   Rather than calculate the possibility or impossibility of a distortion, it would be 
preferable to calculate the likelihood of a nominee’s election having been distorted, or conversely, the 
likelihood of such election changing if universal proxies had been used. However, the for and withhold 
vote data for each nominee doesn’t allow inferences regarding the probability of distortion. In particular, 
it would be necessary to know (or assume) the number of shareholders withholding and the proportion of 
the withhold votes that each could have voted for an opposing nominee. Without this information, the 
maximum and expected number of distorted contests are the most that can be inferred. 
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nominee if shareholders had been permitted to vote for whichever nominee they 
wished.162 
What is the maximum number of votes that could have gone to a nominee? 
It cannot be the total number of votes withheld on a particular card, as that is 
likely to include multiple withholds from investors who have withheld from 
more than one nominee. Since each share only allows one vote per nominee,163 
an investor that withholds from multiple nominees could not reallocate those to 
a single nominee on the other card. 
Because vote results are aggregated, it is impossible to determine how 
many withhold votes were from different shareholders. To illustrate, consider 
the example described in Part II, where two incumbent directors, Mary and 
Nathan, were challenged by two dissident nominees, David and Emily. Assume 
there are two voters, Alice and Bob, each with ten shares, both of which vote on 
the management proxy card. The corporation discloses that each management 
nominee received ten for votes and ten withhold votes, as shown in the left panel 
of Table 6, below. 
Table 6: Multiple Withholds by a Single Shareholder  
Observed Outcome  Possible Scenario 1  Possible Scenario 2 
  Total  Alice Bob  Alice Bob 
  For WH  For WH For WH  For WH For WH 
Mary 10 10  10    10  10    10 
Nathan 10 10    10 10   10   10 
David             
Emily             
 
There are two possible scenarios that could have led to the voting results in 
the left panel of Table 6. In the first scenario, in the center panel, Alice voted for 
Mary and withheld from Nathan, and Bob did the opposite. If the shareholders 
had been able to vote on the dissident card, each of them could have chosen to 
vote for a single dissident. However, the observed outcome could also have 
resulted from Alice voting for Mary and Nathan, and Bob withholding from both 
 
 162.   In the terms used in supra note 155, a distorted outcome is only possible if: fe – fne 
< max(rne) 
 163.   As discussed in supra Section III.A, contests at corporations that permit 
cumulative voting contests were excluded from the sample. 
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nominees, as in the right panel. In that case, if Bob were unconstrained in his 
voting, for instance if he voted on a universal proxy, he could not have cumulated 
the twenty total withhold votes onto a single dissident nominee. He could only 
have voted his ten shares for each of the two dissident nominees. 
The most conservative assumption of the total number of withhold votes 
that could instead be voted for a nominee is the maximum number of withholds 
from a single nominee on the other side, since this could not involve any 
cumulation of multiple votes. This will underestimate potential vote switching 
to the extent an investor did not withhold from the “maximum withhold” 
nominee, but did withhold from another nominee. I consider this assumption in 
greater depth in Section III.E and the effects of varying the assumption. 
There will be withhold votes on each card, so the nominee that was elected 
is also likely to receive some withhold votes. However, to determine the 
maximum number of distortable contests, I assume that none of these withhold 
votes go to the elected nominee. This can be thought of as all withhold votes that 
could switch to a particular elected nominee instead going to other nominees on 
the same card as the elected nominee, with zero to the particular elected nominee. 
This is clearly implausible, but serves to create a maximum bound for possible 
distortions. 
I compare (a) the difference between the number of for votes received by 
the elected nominees and the nonelected nominees, to (b) the maximum number 
of withhold votes that could be received by the last-elected nominees. I consider 
that a nonelected nominee could have been elected in place of an elected nominee 
if (b) is greater than (a).164 I separately consider both the situation where 
withhold votes are distributed to dissident nominees, and to management 
nominees. This creates the potential for switches between sides and within sides. 
Where the dissident has put forward a short slate, I exclude from 
consideration any unopposed management nominees—those that the dissident 
indicated it would vote its proxies for—as their voting results already include 
votes cast on both the management and the dissident cards. 
The potentially distorted proxy contests that result from this analysis are 
listed in Table 7, below. Column (2) shows the number of management and 
dissident nominees elected. Columns (3) and (4) show the results if withhold 
votes were distributed to nonelected dissident nominees. Columns (5) and (6) 
show the results if withhold votes were distributed to nonelected management 
nominees. Columns (3) and (5) show the split of nominees that would have been 
elected with such distributions, and Columns (4) and (6) show whether the 
distributions would have resulted in a dissident nominee replacing a management 
nominee, a management nominee replacing a dissident nominee, a switch in 
nominees within sides, or no switch. Panel 1 shows the results for contests at 
Russell 3000 companies, and Panel 2 shows the results for contests at other 
companies.  
 
 164.   In the terms set out above, I identify distorted outcomes where: fe – fne < max(rne). 
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Table 7: Contests that Could Possibly Have Had Different Outcomes with 
Universal Proxies, 2001-2016 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Company / Dissident, Year 
# M/D 
Elected 








g to D 










Panel 1: Russell 3000 Corporations 
Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. / Carl C. Icahn & 
Eastbourne Capital Management, 2009 
10 / 2 10 / 2 - 11 / 1 D to M 
Benchmark Electronics, Inc. / Engaged Capital LLC, 
2016 
6 / 2 6 / 2 - 6 / 2 Within M 
Biglari Holdings Inc. / Groveland Capital 2015 6 / 0 5 / 1 M to D 6 / 0 - 
Biogen Idec Inc. / Carl C. Icahn, 2009 2 / 2 2 / 2 - 3 / 1 D to M 
Bob Evans Farms, Inc. / Sandell Asset Management 
Corp., 2014 
8 / 4 7 / 5 M to D 8 / 4 Within M 
CSX Corporation / TCI Fund Management (UK) and 3G 
Capital Management, Inc., 2008 
8 / 4 8 / 4 - 9 / 3 D to M 
Datascope Corp. / Ramius Capital Group, LLC, 2007 1 / 1 1 / 1 - 1 / 1 Within M 
Exar Corporation / GWA Investments, LLC, 2005 0 / 3 0 / 3 - 1 / 2 D to M 
Forest Laboratories, Inc. / Carl C. Icahn, 2012 9 / 1 9 / 1 - 9 / 1 Within M 
GenCorp Inc. / Pirate Capital LLC, 2006 0 / 3 0 / 3 - 1 / 2 D to M 
Grubb & Ellis Company / Anthony W. Thompson, 2008 3 / 0 2 / 1 M to D 3 / 0 - 
Hercules Incorporated / International Specialty Products, 
Inc., 2001 
0 / 4 0 / 4 - 1 / 3 D to M 
Insituform Technologies, Inc. / Water Asset 
Management LLC, 2008 
6 / 1 6 / 1 - 6 / 1 Within M 
International Game Technology / Ader Investment 
Management LP, 2013 
7 / 1 7 / 1 - 7 / 1 Within M 
Mentor Graphics Corporation / Carl C. Icahn, 2011 5 / 3 5 / 3 - 6 / 2 D to M 
ModusLink Global Solutions, Inc. / Peerless Systems 
Corporation, 2012 
1 / 1 0 / 2 M to D 1 / 1 - 
Morgans Hotel Group Co. / Kerrisdale Capital 
Management, LLC, 2014 
7 / 2 7 / 2 - 8 / 1 D to M 
Rovi Corporation / Engaged Capital LLC, 2015 5 / 2 5 / 2 - 5 / 2 Within M 
Sensient Technologies Corporation / FrontFour Capital 
Group LLC, 2014 
9 / 0 8 / 1 M to D 9 / 0 - 
Shutterfly, Inc. / Marathon Partners Equity Management, 
LLC, 2015 
1 / 2 0 / 3 M to D 1 / 2 Within M 
Stillwater Mining Company / Clinton Group, Inc., 2013 4 / 4 3 / 5 M to D 4 / 4 Within M 
The Pantry, Inc. / Concerned Pantry Shareholders (Lone 
Star Value Management, LLC and JCP Investment 
Management LLC), 2014 
6 / 3 6 / 3 - 7 / 2 D to M 
ValueVision Media, Inc. / Clinton Group, Inc. and 
Cannell Capital, LLC, 2014 




(1) (2) (5) (3) (4) (6) 
Company / Dissident, Year 
# M/D 
Elected 
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Panel 2: Non-Russell 3000 Corporations 
ALCO Stores, Inc. / Concerned ALCO Stockholders 
(VI Capital Fund, LP) and Milwaukee Private Wealth 
Management, Inc., 2014 
0 / 7 0 / 7 - 1 / 6 D to M 
Benihana Inc. / Providence Recovery Partners, L.P., 
2005 
2 / 0 1 / 1 M to D 2 / 0 - 
California Micro Devices Corporation / Dialectic 
Capital Management LLC, 2009 
4 / 3 4 / 3 - 5 / 2 D to M 
CellStar Corporation / Timothy Durham, 2007 0 / 3 0 / 3 - 1 / 2 D to M 
Crown Crafts, Inc. / Wynnefield Partners Small Cap 
Value, LP, 2007 
2 / 1 2 / 1 - 3 / 0 D to M 
Del Global Technologies Corp. / Steel Partners II, L.P., 
2003 
1 / 4 1 / 4 - 1 / 4 Within M 
Fifth Street Senior Floating Rate Corp. / Ironsides 
Partners LLC, 2016 
1 / 1 0 / 2 M to D 1 / 1 Within M 
Hooper Holmes, Inc. / Ronald V. Aprahamian, 2009 0 / 2 0 / 2 - 1 / 1 D to M 
IEC Electronics Corp. / Vintage Capital Management 
LLC and Kahn Capital Management, 2015 
0 / 7 0 / 7 - 1 / 6 D to M 
Mac-Gray Corporation / Fairview Capital Investment 
Management, 2009 
1 / 1 1 / 1 - 2 / 0 D to M 
Point Blank Solutions, Inc. / Steel Partners II, L.P., 
2008 
2 / 5 2 / 5 - 2 / 5 Within M 
Pro-Dex, Inc. / Nicholas Swenson (AO Partners I, LP) 
and Farnam Street Capital, Inc., 2013 
2 / 3 2 / 3 - 2 / 3 Within M 
Support.com, Inc. / Vertex Capital Advisors LLC, 
Bradley Louis Radoff, and Joshua E. Schechter, 2016 
1 / 5 1 / 5 - 1 / 5 Within M 
Telkonet, Inc. / Peter Kross, 2016 2 / 3 2 / 3 - 2 / 3 Within M 
TICC Capital Corp. / TPG Specialty Lending, Inc., 
2016 
1 / 0 0 / 1 M to D 1 / 0 - 
Tollgrade Communications, Inc. / Ramius Capital 
Group, LLC, 2009 
2 / 3 2 / 3 - 3 / 2 D to M 
Virtus Total Return Fund / Bulldog Investors LLC, 
2016 
1 / 0 0 / 1 M to D 1 / 0 - 
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Table 7 shows that of the proxy contests in the sample, forty contests 
(14.9% of the sample) may have involved a distorted choice among nominees. 
The corollary is that, based on these assumptions, 85.1% of contests could not 
have involved distortion. 
The proportions are generally similar to those assuming uniform 
distribution described above: twenty-eight of the contests involved a distortion 
between sides, of which seventeen (60.7%) would have favored management, 
and eleven (39.3%) would have favored dissidents. Twenty-three contests that 
may have been distorted were at Russell 3000 companies (21.5% of Russell 3000 
contests in the sample), and seventeen were at non-Russell 3000 companies 
(10.5% of those companies in the sample). 
E. Assumptions Underlying Empirical Analysis and Robustness Tests 
The contests considered in this analysis occurred subject to the current 
proxy voting rules. It is therefore impossible to know precisely what the outcome 
would have been with universal proxies. This analysis, and its results, depend 
entirely on a set of assumptions about how investors would have acted had the 
rules of the system been different. In this section, I consider first the validity of 
the assumption that underlies the entire method: that for votes are likely to 
remain the same under universal proxies. I then consider more specific 
assumptions that underlie each of the distributional models and the robustness of 
those assumptions. 
1. Assumption of Independent For Votes 
The key assumption that I make is that each investor would have cast 
the same for votes under a universal proxy system as it did under the current 
proxy system. My model of investors is that, for each contest, each investor 
has a set of preferences among the nominees that are formed prior to—and 
do not change based on—the rules by which the contest will be determined. 
For instance, an investor may prefer all management nominees over any 
dissident nominees; or all dissident nominees over all management 
nominees, or (importantly) some but not all management nominees, and one 
or more dissident nominees. I assume that if an investor prefers all 
management or all dissident nominees under the current proxy voting 
system, that investor would have the same preference under the universal 
proxy voting system, and in each case, vote for all of those nominees. 
Importantly, I assume that if an investor prefers some mix of A management 
and B dissident nominees, then—when subject to the current proxy 
system—the investor votes on either the management card for the A 
nominees, or on the dissident card for the B nominees, and withholds its 
votes from the remaining nominees on the card. I assume that if the investor 
had instead voted on a universal proxy, it would continue to vote for the 
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nominees that they actually voted for, and would not vote for nominees that 
it was able to but declined to vote for under the current system. 
The plausibility of this assumption will depend on the investors making the 
voting decisions. The assumption will fail to the extent that investors vote 
according to their preferences and their preferences change based on the voting 
rules governing the contest. For instance, a large body of literature suggests that 
consumers’ preferences between several options can be affected by the addition 
of another option.165 
Shareholders that vote in director elections are overwhelmingly 
institutional investors. Most of the shares of the corporations which I consider 
are held by institutions—an average of 83% of those corporations in my sample 
that survived as of December 31, 2016. In 2016, 91% of shares owned by 
institutional investors were voted at annual meetings on average, compared to 
28% of shares held by retail investors.166 This suggests that retail investors 
represent about 6% of the votes cast at director elections.167 Institutional 
investors are staffed by professional investment managers that have experience  
determining whether management nominees or dissident nominees are likely to 
be best for the corporation and the investments they manage. Fiduciary duties 
require these managers to take care in exercising these decisions on behalf of 
their investors.168 It therefore seems reasonable to assume that these investors 
will have considered each nominee, and will have some ordering among the 
nominees, and that this will not be affected by the rules of voting. 
A second possible problem may occur if the actors do not vote according 
to their preferences, and vote on different bases depending on the rules. For 
instance, it is possible that investors might vote strategically.169 Two kinds of 
 
 165.   See, e.g., Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff 
Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281 (1992); Amos Tversky & Itamar 
Simonson, Context-Dependent Preferences, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1179 (1993). 
 166.    2016 Proxy Season Review – Third Edition, BROADRIDGE & PWC  1 (2016), 
http://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-proxypulse-2016-proxy-season-review.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8YGZ-2ML9]. 
 167.   The figures are based on uncontested elections, but even if retail investor turnout 
in contested elections were to double, the likely percentage of votes attributable to retail investors would 
be only 11%. That retail investors are likely to represent such a small percentage of shares voted in 
contested elections diminishes considerably the significance of concerns raised by a SEC Commissioner 
and several commentators that the rules the SEC proposes would disadvantage retail shareholders. See 
Michael S. Piwowar, Dissenting Statement at Open Meeting on Universal Proxy, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-piwowar-universal-proxy-
10-26-2015.html [http://perma.cc/RW5U-9P6C] (“In particular, [the] universal proxy proposal will be to 
the detriment of retail investors.”); see also, e.g., Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 
111, at 6; Letter from Quaadman, supra note 108, at 4 (“Because the proposed rules do not require an 
insurgent to solicit all shareholders, it stands to reason that retail investors (who, on average, possess fewer 
votes and proportionally less voting power) will be left out in the cold.”). 
 168.   See, e.g., Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, 
to Robert Monks, Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc. (Jan. 23, 1990), reprinted in 17 Pens. & Ben. Rep. 
(BNA) 244. 
 169.   Any democratic election among three or more candidates is theoretically 
susceptible to strategic manipulation. Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 
41 ECONOMETRICA 587 (1973); Mark Allen Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: 
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strategic voting could be conceived of. Either investors could vote for nominees 
that they do not prefer, or they could vote for only a subset of the nominees they 
prefer, and withhold from others. I discuss the second type of strategic behavior 
further below. As for the possibility that investors would vote “insincerely,” for 
nominees than they do not prefer, it is difficult to see how this could increase the 
chances of their preferred nominees being elected. In addition, insincere voting 
will be made much more difficult given the relatively large number of voters and 
the difficulty in knowing how each is likely to vote. Even if there were an optimal 
strategy to increase the likelihood of preferred nominees being elected, it may be 
very difficult or costly for institutional investors to obtain the necessary 
information and perform the necessary calculations to determine what this 
strategy would be.170 
2. Assumptions Regarding Continuing Withholds 
The discussion above assumes that all of the votes withheld on one side 
will switch to the other side. It is possible that some investors would continue to 
withhold, even if they were permitted to vote for whichever nominee they 
wished. However, this would be irrational.171 In an uncontested election, 
withhold votes have become a way for shareholders to signal their disapproval 
of the directors nominated, even though it is very unlikely to have any effect on 
whether those directors are elected or not. In a contested election, investors have 
a much stronger way of signaling that they disapprove of managers—by voting 
for one or more dissidents. Moreover, if an election is contested, against a 
 
Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J.  
ECON. THEORY 187 (1975). 
 170.   Even if voters have free and perfect information about the voting behavior of other 
voters, it may be computationally difficult for them to determine how best to exploit this information to 
their advantage. See J.J. Bartholdi, C.A. Tovey & M.A. Trick, The Computational Difficulty of 
Manipulating an Election, 6 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 227, 228 (1989) (considering voting systems with 
single winners); see also Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein & Aviv Zohar, 
Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections, 33 J. ARTIF. INT. RES. 149, 154 (2008) 
(considering voting systems with multiple winners). However, strategic voting requires information about 
how other voters are likely to vote. See, e.g., David P. Myatt, On the Theory of Strategic Voting, 74 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 255, 274 (2007). This may be costly or difficult to acquire. Even in single-winner elections, 
strategic voting is generally considered to be less common in practice than often thought. See, e.g., R. 
Michael Alvarez & Jonathan Nagler, A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty 
Elections, 30 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 57, 75 (2000). 
 171.   It is possible that an investor could wish to withhold to signal disapproval of both 
a management nominee and a dissident nominee. However, such a signal will be much less clear (and 
presumably, much less likely to be sent), in a contested election. Consider an uncontested election with m 
nominees and n shareholders. It will be clear if shareholders withhold from any particular nominee, as 
that nominee will receive fewer than m × n total votes. However, in a contested election, shareholders 
cannot vote for all m nominees. It will not be clear from any particular nominee’s vote total whether 
shareholders withheld from them and voted for a nominee on the other side, or withheld from nominees 
on both sides. While it would be possible to compare the total number of votes that could be cast for all 
nominees, and the total number that were actually cast to determine the aggregate number of shares that 
were not voted for either side, this would require additional computations from the figures disclosed, and 
it is not clear what the appropriate interpretation of this figure would be. As a result, any attempt to send 
a signal by withholding from both sides would seem to be quixotic at best. 
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baseline of voting for management, withholding from management would have 
the same directional effect as voting for a dissident, but in a weaker form.172 
As discussed above, 90% or more of the votes represented in director 
elections are those of institutional investors.173 U.S. institutional investors have 
fiduciary duties to vote their shares,174 because their vote is a resource they hold 
as a fiduciary for their investors. As a practical matter, these investors do vote 
their shares; more than 90% of shares controlled by institutional investors are 
voted.175 Using their votes in a weaker rather than stronger fashion could be 
considered a breach of fiduciary duty. 
There may be a strategic reason for institutional investors to continue to 
withhold from some of their preferred nominees. Among the nominees that they 
would like to have elected, some institutional investors may have much stronger 
preferences in favor of some nominees than others. For instance, an institutional 
investor that would like to split its vote between management and dissident 
nominees may feel much more strongly that a dissident nominee should be 
elected than that their preferred management nominees be elected. In that case, 
the investor may be willing to withhold from the management nominee they 
prefer, in order to reduce the likelihood that the management nominee would be 
elected in place of the dissident nominee. Whether or not this strategy is likely 
to be used is difficult to determine. Conversations with a number of institutional 
investor representatives who are involved in voting decisions suggest that most 
would not use this strategy, although one representative did indicate that their 
funds may consider voting in this way. 
Some evidence of whether institutional investors will continue to withhold 
when voting on a universal proxy can be gathered from the results of the 2013 
proxy contest at Transocean Ltd. There were five management nominees up for 
election; Carl Icahn nominated three dissident nominees.176 As discussed in 
Section I.C, because Transocean is a Swiss corporation, it used a universal proxy. 
However, because it is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, it is subject to 
U.S. securities regulations. Investment companies that voted shares in the proxy 
 
 172.   The effects of switching versus withholding can be analogized to the effects of 
wins in games between two Major League Baseball rivals, compared to wins in other games.. If the Boston 
Red Sox beat the New York Yankees, then compared to the Yankees, the Red Sox’s win-loss record will 
rise by two: the Red Sox record a win, and the Yankees record a loss. If the Red Sox beat any other team, 
the Red Sox’ win-loss record will rise only one compared to the Yankees: the Red Sox record a win, but 
the Yankees do not record a loss. For an investor whose baseline is voting for management, the latter 
situation is akin to choosing to withhold, rather than choosing to vote for the dissident. 
 173.   SHARKREPELLENT, supra note 32. 
 174.   See, e.g., Letter from Lebowitz, supra note 168, at 3 (“The fiduciary act of 
managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of proxies appurtenant to those 
shares of stock.”). This opinion applies to advisers to qualified pension plans, which is functionally most 
investment advisers that advise pension plans or defined contribution plans. It does not technically apply 
to state public pension plans, but these generally regard themselves as having fiduciary duties that require 
them to vote. 
 175.   BROADRIDGE & PWC, supra note 166, at 1. 
 176.   Data from SharkRepellent.net, last accessed March 23, 2018. See supra note 32. 
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contest were required to disclose their votes in the contest.177 Of the 319 
investment companies disclosing valid votes, 310 (97%) voted for 5 nominees.178 
Only 9 funds (2.8%) chose to withhold by voting for fewer than 5 nominees.179 
While caution is warranted in placing significant weight on the results of a single 
proxy contest at a non-U.S. corporation, this would seem to support the 
conclusion that institutional investors would not continue to withhold votes in 
proxy contests in significant numbers if unconstrained by the current proxy 
voting rules. 
For the reasons above, I consider it reasonable to assume that shareholders 
will not withhold. However, I conduct robustness tests by relaxing this 
assumption, and assuming that a certain proportion of investors continue to 
withhold, assuming 10%, 25% and 50% of shares withheld would continue to be 
withheld even if shareholders had the opportunity to vote for whichever nominee 
they wished.180 These tests are described in Table 8. 
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis for Expected Distorted Proxy Contests Assuming 
Continuing Withholding 
 
Assuming 10% continuing withholds, sixteen of the eighteen expected 
distorted contests (89%) would continue to have different outcomes, whether 
withholds are distributed uniformly or proportionally. Even assuming 25% or 
50% continued withholding, between nine and twelve contests (50% to 67%) 
would be expected to be distorted, suggesting that the analysis is robust to 
significant variation of assumptions. 
 
 177.   Form N-PX, 17 C.F.R. § 274.129 (2017) (requiring the disclosure of proxy voting 
records). 
 178.   Data obtained from ProxyInsight, last accessed November 30, 2017. 
 179.   Id. 
 180.   The expected undistorted for votes for each nominee i, E(ui), are calculated as a 
function of the for votes (fi) received by the nominee and the withhold votes (wj) received by each of the 
n opposing nominees, j, as: E(ui) = fi + (1 – c) ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 . 
   n 
Distributional Assumption 
Proportion of Other Withhold Votes Switching 
0% 10% 25% 50% 
Uniform 18 16 12 9 
Proportional 18 16 10 9 
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3. Assumptions Regarding Maximum Withholds 
In determining the maximum number of votes withheld that might instead 
be voted for a particular nominee, I used the maximum number of withholds 
from a single nominee on the other side, since this avoids the possible cumulation 
of multiple votes, which is not permitted in the contests that I consider. Where 
different shareholders withhold from different nominees, this analysis will 
disregard situations where multiple distinct withholding shareholders would 
have voted for a single nominee and will therefore underestimate the potential 
level of distortion. 
To consider the effects of weakening this assumption, and the continuing 
withhold assumption described above, I conduct sensitivity analyses on the 
maximum distortion analysis. I assume that in addition to the maximum number 
of votes withheld against an opposing nominee, a certain percentage of votes 
withheld from other nominees are from distinct shareholders. I assume that 0%, 
10%, 25% or 50% of withholds on the opposing card other than those for the 
maximum withhold nominee also switch to the nonelected nominee. As above, I 
also consider continuing withhold levels of 0%, 10%, 25% or 50%.181 The results 
are shown in Table 9 below. 
Table 9: Number of Maximum Distorted Proxy Contests Assuming Additional 
Switching and/or Continuing Withholding 
 
Table 9 supports the view that the calculations are generally robust even if 
the assumptions used are weakened. Even assuming that 50% of investors 
continue to withhold, the number of contests that could result in switches falls 
less than 25%. 
 
 181.   For each pair of an elected nominee e and a nonelected nominee ne, distorted  
outcomes are identified for each model where: fe – fne < (1 – c)(max(rne) + s(∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 )).  
Proportion of Other 
Withhold Votes Switching 
Proportion of Withhold Votes Continuing 
to Withhold 
0% 10% 25% 50% 
0% 40 38 32 28 
10% 41 40 36 30 
25% 46 44 40 33 
50% 52 50 44 39 
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IV. The Implications for Proxy Contests 
This part considers the implications of the results in Part 0 for the universal 
proxy debate. First, it considers the likely consequences of a universal proxy rule 
for distortions in proxy contests. Second, it considers why groups representing 
managers may have opposed universal proxies, even though universal proxies 
are likely to favor managers. Third, it considers the conclusions that can and 
cannot be drawn regarding the normative implications of universal proxies. 
A. The Likely Consequences of Universal Proxies 
A number of inferences regarding distortions in proxy contests and the 
effects of universal proxies can be drawn from these results. Obviously, these 
conclusions are based on previous contests, and there is no assurance that the 
underlying behavior or outcomes would remain the same were universal proxies 
adopted. However, as the discussion in Section III.E.1 regarding investor voting 
behavior made clear, there are reasons to believe that investor preferences might 
be independent of the voting system and not driven by strategic considerations, 
which would suggest that conclusions from the past may be useful for contests 
in the future. This section first considers the implications of universal proxies for 
the significance of distortions. It then considers the arguments made by 
opponents of universal proxies, who say that universal proxies would favor 
dissident nominees, and would lead to more proxy contests. There are also a 
number of other inferences that can be drawn from the empirical evidence. 
1. The Significance of Distortions, and Universal Proxies 
The earlier analysis demonstrates that the mix-and-match problem can 
result in distortions in proxy contests, and that these are a real and practical 
problem. The analysis identifies at least eighteen and up to forty companies that 
are likely to have had a director elected without plurality support. Assuming 
votes were cast rationally in these contests, it is likely that shareholders believed 
that another director would have made better decisions on behalf of the company. 
By lowering the likelihood that directors making poor choices would be replaced 
in the event of a contest, or that directors making good choices would be 
reelected, these distortions are likely to have weakened the incentives of 
directors to make value-enhancing decisions in the much broader set of 
companies where there was at least a threat of a proxy contest. 
The absolute number of contests that may be affected by universal proxies 
appears to be small. The strongest conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis 
above is that, even assuming maximum switching, 229 proxy contests (85.1%) 
would have been completely unaffected by universal proxies. However, this is a 
result of there being very few proxy contests that actually went to a vote. The 
possibly distorted forty contests represent 14.9% of the proxy contests in the 
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sample, a significant percentage; the eighteen contests at which universal proxies 
can be expected to have changed outcomes represent 6.7% of all proxy contests 
considered. 
While these numbers are still relatively small, as discussed in Part I, those 
contests that do go to a vote set the expectations for dissidents and management 
making decisions in the much larger number of engagements that are settled, and 
the very large number of corporations where an engagement could potentially 
take place.182 Therefore, the significant proportion of contests with distorted 
outcomes is likely to have an outsized significance, influencing the decision to 
settle and the terms of settlement of many more engagements between 
management and dissidents, as well as decisions about potential engagements 
made by dissidents and managers. 
2. Which Side Would Universal Proxies Favor? 
As discussed above, distorted outcomes can favor either management or 
dissidents in proxy contests. Similarly, eliminating distorted outcomes could 
favor either dissidents or management. 
The results above show that, of the fifteen contests where universal proxies 
can be expected to have had distortions between sides, management nominees 
can be expected to have been favored at ten contests, and dissident nominees at 
five contests. These results are not significantly different from an even split 
between favoring management and favoring dissidents. This casts doubt on the 
claim made by opponents of universal proxies that they are likely to help 
dissidents. If anything, to the extent universal proxies led to different outcomes 
in contests, they would favor management more frequently than dissidents. 
3. The Frequency of Proxy Contests 
Opponents of a universal proxy rule have raised the concern that universal 
proxies would increase the ease by which dissidents can mount proxy contests, 
and therefore increase the frequency of proxy contests. This is perceived as a 
cost of a universal proxy rule, because those commentators view shareholder 
activism and proxy contests as generally harmful to corporations. Whatever 
one’s view on the value of proxy contests and shareholder activism, the results 
above undermine opponents’ claim. 
The results above suggest that, at the proxy contests conducted since 2001, 
a universal proxy rule would have reduced dissidents’ success in proxy contests, 
or, put another way, made it more difficult for dissidents to be successful in proxy 
 
 182.   As a point of comparison, of the 4,417 securities class actions filed between 1996 
and 2014, only 16 (0.4%) actually reached a verdict. See Stefan Boettrich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent 
Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2016 Full-Year Review, NERA 2, 41 (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2017/PUB_2016_Securities_Year-
End_Trends_Report_0117.pdf [http://perma.cc/BJ69-78GN]. 
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contests. To the extent this would have affected the decisions of dissidents to 
initiate proxy contests, it would have actually made proxy contests slightly less 
frequent. 
4. The Frequency of Mixed Board Outcomes 
A number of commentators have suggested that universal proxies may 
increase the success of dissidents not overall, but by increasing the incidence of 
mixed boards, that is, of at least one dissident nominee being elected. The 
argument seems to be based on the belief that shareholders that are currently 
dissatisfied with management but prefer to vote on the management card cannot 
currently vote for any dissident shareholders. With a universal proxy, those 
shareholders could vote for at least one dissident, rather than just withhold from 
management. 
Of the forty contests where universal proxies could possibly have resulted 
in a different outcome, only six would have gone from zero dissidents elected to 
at least one dissident elected. Therefore, the concern that universal proxies would 
result in more mixed board results should be limited. 
5. Universal Proxies and Dissidents with Parochial Interests 
Opponents of a universal proxy rule have suggested that it would facilitate 
proxy fights by individual shareholders or small groups with parochial interests 
that aren’t shared by the wider body of shareholders.183 The evidence presented 
above allows the evaluation of this claim. 
An example of the kind of parochial interest that critics appear to have in 
mind may be that of Peter Lindner. As noted in Section III.A, the data exclude 
certain non-bona fide proxy contests. These include four annual meetings at 
American Express Corporation where Mr. Lindner, a disgruntled former 
employee of the corporation, put himself forward for election as a director. In 
each of these cases, Mr. Lindner did not file a definitive proxy statement or solicit 
proxies from investors and received only eleven votes (out of a total of more than 
900 million votes cast at the meeting), corresponding to the eleven shares he 
himself owned of record.184 The universal proxy rule proposed in the Release 
would require dissidents to solicit at least 50% of shares able to vote at the 
meeting. This would exclude situations companies from having to use universal 
proxies in situations such as Mr. Lindner’s. 
Would universal proxies facilitate proxy contests by special interest groups 
more generally? This can be evaluated by considering the level of support that 
 
 183.   Letter from Quaadman, supra note 17, at 4 (“[T]he universal proxy card would 
facilitate proxy fights by individual shareholders (or small groups of shareholders) . . . who may nominate 
directors who advance their own parochial agenda without regard to the broader interests of the company 
or its shareholders.”). 
 184.   See supra note 145. 
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dissidents received in proxy contests and in the proxy contests whose outcomes 
might be affected by universal proxies. Dissidents that receive support from a 
significant proportion of shares voted at the meeting could not be said to be 
special interest shareholders. Dissidents with special interest that do not 
represent the preferences of a significant number of shareholders will therefore 
be those that receive a limited percentage of support in the election. Figure 7, 
below, shows the distribution of proxy contests by the number of votes cast at 
the meeting where investors voted for at least one dissident nominee. 
Figure 7: Support for Dissidents in Contests Expected to be Distorted, Possibly 
Distorted, and Not Distortable 
 
Figure 7 shows a wide distribution of levels of support for dissidents in 
proxy contests. Contrary to expectations, a significant number of proxy contests 
go to a vote even though dissidents receive limited support. At thirty-five 
contests (13%), less than 20% of shares voted for at least one dissident. However, 
those contests whose outcomes can be expected to be affected by universal 
proxies and those additional contests that might potentially be affected by 
universal proxies are those that generally receive much higher levels of dissident 
support. None of the thirty-five contests where dissidents received votes from 
less than 20% of shareholders could have been affected by a universal proxy rule, 
and only 8 of the 149 contests where less than 50% of shares supported any 
dissident (5.4% of those contests, and 3.0% of all contests). It would therefore 
seem that a well-designed universal proxy rule is unlikely to affect the success 
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6. Effects of Universal Proxies on Choices of Nominees 
At an SEC roundtable debating possible universal proxy rules, one 
commentator suggested that a move to universal proxies might result in a greater 
focus on the nominees, rather than the side that they represent.185 This seems to 
be consistent with the analysis in Part II regarding distortions within sides. Under 
the current proxy system, shareholders are forced to undertake a two-step 
process: first, does the shareholder prefer the management side or the activist 
side, and second, which of the nominees on the chosen side’s card should the 
shareholder vote for. In contests in which a universal proxy card is solicited, 
shareholders are able to choose any nominee, without distortion, including 
among nominees on the same card. 
At sixteen of the forty contests identified in Section III.C (40% of those 
contests) that may have had distorted outcomes, there could have been a distorted 
choice within sides. If universal proxies were implemented, there could be some 
reordering of the nominees that were elected within each side. At a number of 
these corporations, management nominees involved in the distortion were either 
the CEO or the Chairman of the corporation.186 Each of these potentially 
distorted choices, as well as the other distorted choices within sides, may have 
had an impact on board composition, and potentially corporate performance. If 
shareholders do indeed place more emphasis on the quality of nominees, this 
may affect the nominees that each side chooses to nominate. 
7. Universal Proxies and Voting Behavior 
Universal proxies may force shareholders to change their voting behavior 
to achieve their desired outcomes. Some shareholders may currently vote for 
nominees with the intention that a particular split of management and dissident 
nominees will be elected, e.g., that two out of four dissident nominees would be 
elected. These shareholders may have adopted voting behavior based on 
 
 185.   See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROXY VOTING ROUNDTABLE (unofficial 
transcript) 45 (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-voting-roundtable/proxy-voting-
roundtable-transcript.txt [perma.cc/Q5NK-AJ6N] (statement of Chris Cernich) (“One of the interesting 
things about a universal ballot . . . is that it actually puts an awful lot more emphasis on the qualifications 
going forward of each of the nominees.”). 
 186.   At Bob Evans Farm, the election of Chairman & CEO Steven Davis may have 
been distorted, and had it not been, may have instead resulted in the election of another management 
nominee, Bill Ingram or Cheryl Krueger. At Shutterfly, the election of CEO Jeffrey Housenbold may have 
been distorted, and had shareholders been able to vote as they wished, another management candidate, 
James White, may have been elected in his place. At Amylin Pharmaceuticals, the board chairman, Joseph 
Cook, was not elected, but may have been elected in place of another management nominee, James Gavin, 
had there been no distortion. In other proxy fights, distortions may have affected whether the chief 
executive officer of the corporation was elected as a director, albeit with low levels of likelihood. For 
instance, at Stillwater Mining, CEO Francis McCallister was elected, however it is possible that a dissident 
nominee, Greg Taxin, would have been elected in his place had withhold votes been voted for nominees. 
At Mac-Gray, CEO Stewart MacDonald was not elected, but may have been elected in place of dissident 
Bruce Ginsberg had withheld votes instead been voted for nominees. 
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experience from previous proxy contests, where they have learned that such 
voting behavior will be more likely to result in the election of the number of 
dissident nominees that they prefer. For instance, the shareholder may choose to 
vote on the dissident card but withhold from two unwanted dissident directors. 
As discussed in Part II, if those withhold votes are instead cast in favor of 
management candidates, the management candidates may receive more for votes 
than the dissidents, and fewer dissidents may be elected than the shareholders 
would prefer. Shareholders may therefore need to collectively adjust their voting 
behavior so that their preferred split of directors is elected. That is, shareholders 
may currently vote with a particular equilibrium in mind, and will need to change 
their behavior to maintain that equilibrium given the changes in voting from 
universal proxies. In the example above, shareholders might vote for more 
dissident nominees, or (as suggested in Section III.E.2) may withhold from 
management nominees whose election they prefer less than the dissident 
nominees. The impact of such changes on the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the analysis is discussed further in Section IV.B. 
8. Explaining Management Opposition to Universal Proxies 
On their face, the findings in Part III present a puzzle. Why have groups 
like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable that represent 
managers staunchly opposed a proposal that would likely assist managers in the 
face of challenges from dissidents? It could be that these groups have conducted 
research demonstrating that the actual effects of a universal proxy rule favor 
dissidents. However, if this were true, they would likely have included such 
research in making their case for how the rule would favor special interests and 
increase the incidence of proxy contests. Any such evidence would not only have 
strengthened their case considerably, it may have led the SEC to a different 
conclusion in its economic analysis and could have provided grounds for a 
challenge to the validity of the rule under the Administrative Procedure Act.187 
An alternative explanation could be that the Chamber of Commerce and Business 
Roundtable misunderstand the likely effects of the rule. Were that the case, 
evidence presented in this Article may cause them to reconsider. 
If management interest groups do not relax their opposition to universal 
proxies, despite evidence that universal proxies might be advantageous for them, 
why might this be the case? One explanation is that preventing universal proxies 
may be a minor battle in a broader campaign against expansions in shareholder 
 
 187.   With respect to the SEC’s recent conflict minerals rule, groups representing 
managers—including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable—put forward 
considerable evidence of the cost of the rule, which formed the basis for a challenge to the validity of the 
rule. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable have themselves brought such 
challenges to SEC rules in the past, for instance, in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 
412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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power.188 The effect of universal proxies in eliminating distorted proxy contest 
outcomes means that it decreases the “noise” in corporate voting189—the 
instances where director election outcomes do not match the result from an 
aggregation of shareholder preferences—and increases the “signal-to-noise 
ratio”—the extent to which shareholder votes result in the collectively-desired 
combination of directors being elected. This can be thought of as another level 
of effect of proxy rules to add to those described in Section I.C.3 and Figure 1: 
by enhancing shareholders’ influence over corporate elections, universal proxies 
affect the power of shareholders vis-à-vis managers. 
Viewed through this lens, the opposition to universal proxies by the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable may be rational, even 
though universal proxies would bolster the position of individual managers. It 
may be more important for managers to oppose the expansion of shareholder 
power through universal proxies, which could beget further increases.190 Were 
universal proxies to be implemented and not result in the negative consequences 
foreseen by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable, 
regulators might reasonably consider implementing regulations that further 
increased shareholder power. Any weakening of the opposition to shareholder-
power-increasing regulations might embolden investors to further seeksuch 
increases. 
The politics of universal proxies appears to be even starker than the 
examples described by Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock.191 In their examples, 
the reforms opposed by managers would have had negative effects on most 
managers.192 In this case, universal proxies are likely to assist most managers in 
defending against dissidents. Yet this benefit would appear to be dominated by 
the importance of opposing increases in shareholder power. 
B. The Implications for the Universal Proxy Debate 
The normative implications of universal proxies can be thought of in two 
dimensions. First, universal proxies eliminate the distortions that can result from 
the current system of proxy voting rules. This has important ex post and ex ante 
benefits for corporations. The current system may result in the election of 
 
 188.   Kahan & Rock, supra note 19, at 2024. Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock consider 
most closely symbolic exercises in corporate governance politics, but also consider strategic explanations 
for interest group actions on shareholder voting rules. Although their theory focuses on the actions of 
shareholder activists, their theory also serves to explain the actions of management. 
 189.   Since shareholders can use legal proxies, it is more precise to say that universal 
proxies lower the cost of noise reduction in corporate voting. 
 190.   Kahan and Rock make a similar argument for the battle over proxy access. See 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 19, at 2024 
 191.   Kahan and Rock give the examples of poison pills, proxy access, majority voting, 
and supermajority provisions. Id. at 1998. 




directors that shareholders do not believe are likely to make the best decisions in 
the management of the corporation. By doing so, the current system may also 
reduce the incentives of directors to make good decisions, since it is less likely 
that their reelection will hinge on shareholders’ views of their decisions. 
Universal proxies would remedy both of these problems. 
The second dimension is whether universal proxies would advantage one 
side or the other in proxy contests, and how it might affect settlement decisions 
and decisions by activists on whether to initiate proxy contests. On this 
dimension, the normative implications of universal proxies are much less clear, 
for two reasons. First, the results from Part 0 represent, at best, a partial 
equilibrium. The proxy contest system is likely to reequilibrate to incorporate 
the effects of universal proxies on proxy contest outcomes. For instance, as 
described in Section IV.0, if universal proxies lead to lower support for 
dissidents and a lower likelihood of dissident campaigns being successful, but 
institutional investors prefer the current level of dissident success, institutional 
investors are likely to increase the extent to which they support dissidents. 
Second, the corporate-value effects of a universal proxy rule depend on the 
effects of hedge fund activism on longer-term corporate value, which are the 
subject of much debate. Even assuming that the long-term equilibrium effect of 
universal proxies means fewer dissident nominees were elected and fewer proxy 
contests would be initiated, it is not clear the effect this would have on 
corporations. The lower threat of hedge fund activism might increase the value 
of corporations, by permitting managers to undertake long-term value-enhancing 
actions without the threat of short-term-appropriative hedge fund activism.193 
Alternatively, the lower threat of hedge fund activism might decrease the value 
of corporations, by reducing the discipline on managers to undertake value-
enhancing actions.194 For this reason, the SEC declined to predict the effects of 
universal proxies on corporate governance.195 As a result of these difficulties, 
there is not sufficient extant evidence for a comprehensive analysis of all of the 
value effects of universal proxies. 
Combining these two dimensions of normative implications, it is clear that 
universal proxies offer significant benefits in eliminating distortions. These 
benefits exist in addition to whatever expressive benefits shareholders receive 
from being able to vote for the mix of nominees that they prefer. It is much less 
clear that universal proxies would have particular costs or benefits associated 
with favoring one side or another, or increasing or decreasing the level of hedge 
fund activism. The analysis in Part III dispels the main arguments made against 
 
 193.   See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 35; Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund 
Activism and Long-Term Firm Value (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231 [http://perma.cc/PWD6-TVFU]. 
 194.   See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 37. 
 195.   See Exchange Act Release No. 34-79164, 81 Fed. Reg. 79,122, 79,127 (Nov. 10, 
2016) (“[I]t is difficult to predict the likely extent or direction of these broader potential effects, but we 
cannot rule out the possibility that they could be significant.” (footnote omitted)). 
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universal proxies. Universal proxies are unlikely to favor dissidents or special 
interests and consequently, are unlikely to result in an increase in the number of 
proxy contests. If anything, universal proxies are likely to favor managers, so 
may result in a decrease in the number of proxy contests. Since this calculus 
provides strong arguments for universal proxies and weakens the arguments 
against, should lead the SEC to towards implementing universal proxies. Part 0 
considers how such implementation could take place. 
V. Fixing Distortions in Proxy Contests 
Given the conclusion that universal proxies should be implemented, 
Section V.0 considers how SEC regulation should be structured, taking into 
account the uncertainty about the ultimate effects of universal proxies. However, 
there are a number of obstacles to an SEC universal proxy regulation in the 
current political environment. Given investor support for universal proxies, 
Section V.0 considers how investors could themselves implement universal 
proxies, as a second-best solution to SEC regulation. 
A. Universal Proxy Regulation 
Before evaluating the universal proxy rule in the SEC’s Release, this 
Section considers the potential alternatives for proxy regulations. Potential 
regulations differ in the nature of the default proxy arrangement, and whether the 
arrangement is mandatory or privately ordered.196 
Default proxy arrangements at corporations could take several forms. An 
arrangement could effectively prohibit a universal proxy, such as by preventing  
nominees from being included in the proxy statements of other nominees, or by 
using the current rule, which prohibits such inclusion without consent of the 
nominee. Alternatively, the arrangement could also be structured to permit one 
or both sides to use a universal proxy, by allowing either side to include 
nominees that had consented to be nominated in any proxy statement for the 
meeting.197 Finally, an arrangement could require each party to include both 
parties’ nominees on their proxy card, as in the SEC’s proposed universal proxy 
rule.198 
A second dimension is whether all corporations of a particular kind are 
required to have the particular arrangement regarding proxy voting (a mandatory 
rule) or whether corporations are permitted to switch from the default 
 
 196.   For a more general and comprehensive discussion of the arguments applied here 
to proxy arrangements, see Scott Hirst, The Case for Investor Ordering (Harvard Law Sch. Program on 
Corp. Governance Discussion Paper 2017-13, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3011327 
[https://perma.cc/KR3K-H5AS]. 
 197.   The SEC raised the possibility of permitting but not requiring a universal proxy 
card in its proposed rulemaking, but did not compare the potential costs and benefits of such a rule to the 
rule it proposed. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 79, 128 n. 67. 
 198.   Id. at 79,122. 
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arrangement to another arrangement (a privately ordered rule). The SEC’s 
proposed universal proxy rule is a mandatory rule: the corporations to which the 
rule applied would be required to follow the arrangements for universal proxies 
set out in Rule 14a-19.199 The current bona fide nominee rule is also mandatory, 
in the sense that all corporations have the same arrangement whereby nominees 
may only be included on proxy cards if the nominee has consented to be named 
in that nominee’s proxy statement, and firms cannot choose to opt out of that 
arrangement. 
The alternative is for the rule to permit private ordering. For instance, the 
proposed rule could permit corporations to opt out of the requirement that both 
parties use universal proxy cards. The corporation could then  replace that 
arrangement with an alternative, such as using universal proxy cards or 
prohibiting them without consent. Where a rule is privately ordered, a further 
consideration is how the corporation is permitted to switch from the default 
arrangement to an alternative arrangement. For instance, switching could be 
initiated by management, investors, or both and could either require approval by 
managers, investors, or both. The next Section considers the choice among the 
parameters described above in reverse order. 
The conclusions drawn in Section 0 have important implications regarding 
the choice among alternative proxy rules. A universal proxy rule would be 
valuable in reducing distortions, and the arguments made against a universal 
proxy rule appear invalid. On the other hand, as discussed in Section 0, there are 
considerable unresolvable uncertainties about the ultimate costs and benefits of 
a universal proxy rule. This suggests that while the SEC should change the 
default arrangement to permit or require universal proxies, this arrangement 
should not be mandatory, but should instead permit corporations to opt out of 
universal proxies by appropriate corporate action. 
Given the uncertain costs and benefits associated with a universal proxy 
rule, a privately ordered universal proxy rule would result in the same or greater 
aggregate net benefit as a mandatory rule.200 Opponents of a universal proxy rule 
argue that it would be costly for corporations.201 If universal proxies indeed 
 
 199.   Id. 
 200.   This assumes that a universal proxy rule would have little or no potential 
externalities outside the corporation, or that such potential externalities would not be internalized by 
investors in the corporation. See Hirst, supra note 196 (discussing the externality assumption underlying 
investor ordering). This seems to be a reasonable assumption: a corporation’s proxy voting arrangement 
is unlikely to affect parties other than the corporation itself and its investors, and no such externalities 
were identified in comments to the Release. However, this would be for the SEC to determine in their 
rulemaking. 
 201.   See, e.g., Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 111, at 6; Letter 
from John A. Hayes, Chair, Corp. Governance Comm., Bus. Roundtable, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-16/s72416-1468026-
130391.pdf [http://perma.cc/5CWT-77HB]; Letter from Quaadman, supra note 108, at 6; Letter from 
Darla C. Stuckey, President & CEO, Soc’y for Corp. Governance, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 2 (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-16/s72416-1475144-130482.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Y63U-SEAL]. 
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proved costly for some corporations, those corporations would opt out of 
universal proxies where the cost of the universal proxy rule was greater than the 
(likely low) cost of opting out. As a result, if any corporations chose to opt out 
of a universal proxy rule, the rule would have greater aggregate net benefit than 
a mandatory rule. If universal proxies had benefits for all corporations (or costs 
that were less than the cost of opting out), then no corporations would opt out, 
and a privately ordered rule would have the same aggregate net benefit as a 
mandatory rule. 
To be optimal, a privately ordered rule would require investor approval for 
corporations to opt out of universal proxies, what I refer to as “investor-
ordering.” Since the incentives of managers and investors regarding a universal 
proxy rule may not be aligned, managers may opt out when it is in their own 
interests, but that may not maximize the value of the corporation. In contrast, 
investors not aligned with managers or dissidents will prefer to maximize the 
value of the corporation, so would only approve opt-outs that were value-
maximizing. Since dissident investors generally hold less than 10% of the 
outstanding shares of the corporation,202 they could influence, but not determine, 
the outcome of a vote to opt out of a universal proxy arrangement. Nevertheless, 
it may be preferable for a regulation to require that any opt-outs from universal 
proxy rules take place before the pendency of a proxy contest. 
Implementing universal proxies by investor-ordering rather than as a 
mandatory rule would have two additional benefits for the SEC. First, an 
investor-ordered regulation would be less susceptible to judicial invalidation. 
Given the opposition to universal proxies from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
and the Business Roundtable, there is significant possibility that one or both 
organizations might challenge an SEC universal proxy rule before the D.C. 
Circuit. Each organization has successfully challenged SEC rules in the past,203 
including a successful challenge by both organizations to the SEC’s most recent 
attempt at significant proxy regulation.204 The requirement that the SEC consider 
reasonable alternatives as part of its cost-benefit analysis205 means that it would 
be required to consider an investor-ordered rule. For the reasons outlined above, 
an investor-ordered rule will have the same or greater aggregate net benefits as 
a mandatory rule. If the SEC nevertheless implemented a mandatory rule, that 
 
 202.   Brav et al., supra note 27, at 1747 (noting that the “median (maximum) percentage 
stake that a hedge fund takes in the target is 6.3% (9.1%)”). 
 203.   See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(challenging SEC rulemaking requiring mutual funds to have independent directors); Chamber of 
Commerce of the U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same); Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 
406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (challenging the SEC’s decision to bar self-regulatory organizations from listing 
dual-class stock). 
 204.   Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating the 
SEC’s proxy access rule). 
 205.   See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. FERC, 873 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(requiring an agency to consider “facially reasonable alternatives” raised by a party).  
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decision could be considered arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.206 
If the SEC did choose to implement an investor-ordered rule, its analysis of 
the potential costs of the rule would be considerably more straightforward and 
less open to challenge. Given the uncertainties discussed in Section 0, 
determining the costs of a mandatory universal proxy with any degree of 
precision is likely impossible, and the effort to do so would be an inviting target 
for opponents to challenge the validity of the rule.207 However, the cost of an 
investor-ordered rule would be capped at the cost of corporations opting out of 
the rule. This would be much easier and less costly for the SEC to ascertain. 
Second, the SEC undertakes retrospective analysis of its regulations, as 
recommended by Executive Order 13,579208 and as often required by 
Congress.209 Retrospective analysis of a mandatory universal proxy rule would 
be important given the uncertainty of the effects of the rule. If the costs 
prophesied by opponents of the rule were to materialize, retrospective analysis 
and revision of the regulation would be the only way to avoid such costs. 
However, retrospective analysis of a mandatory universal proxy rule would be 
difficult because there would be no variation in the corporations affected by the 
rule. Retrospective analysis of an investor-ordered universal proxy rule would 
be less necessary, because if there were substantial costs, corporations would 
simply opt out of the rule. To the extent retrospective analysis would be valuable, 
it would be more straightforward for an investor-ordered universal proxy rule, as 
the number of corporations that had opted out of the rule would provide a ready 
metric of the value of the rule. A low incidence of opting out of the rule would 
lend legitimacy to the rule and rebut criticisms. The variation in outcomes of 
proxy contests at corporations that had and had not opted out would make 
determination of the effects of the rule more straightforward. 
An investor-ordered rule would make the choice of default proxy 
arrangement less consequential than a mandatory rule. If corporations believe 
that an alternative proxy arrangement was preferable, they could opt out of the 
default and into the alternative arrangement. 
There are reasons to believe that an arrangement permitting but not 
requiring a universal proxy would be sufficient. Since the outcome of an election 
is a zero-sum game, a universal proxy is likely to benefit one side or the other. 
 
 206.   See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012); Bus. Roundtable, 
647 F.3d at 1148 (finding the SEC’s failure to undertake sufficient economic analysis to be arbitrary and 
capricious). 
 207.   See, e.g., id. at 1149 (citing, as grounds for invalidating the rule, that the SEC 
“failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or explain why those costs could not be quantified”); see 
also Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (challenging, in conjunction 
with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the SEC’s conflict mineral rule on the grounds that it insufficiently 
considered the costs of the rule). 
 208.   Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,585 (July 14, 2011). 
 209.   The draft Financial CHOICE Act would require retrospective analysis of regulations 
every five years. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 315-316 (2017). 
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Therefore, one side or the other could be counted upon to distribute a universal 
proxy in every contest, and shareholders would invariably have the opportunity 
to use a universal proxy even though it was not required. However, there may be 
some uncertainty regarding the effect of a universal proxy, leading neither side 
to distribute a universal proxy. Alternatively, if a universal proxy advantaged a 
dissident, the dissident might not distribute the proxy card to all shareholders in 
order to reduce mailing expenses, preventing some shareholders from being able 
to vote on a universal proxy. 
A final consideration in favor of an arrangement permitting rather than 
requiring universal proxies is Section 845 of the draft Financial CHOICE Act. If 
the provision becomes law, it would prohibit the SEC from “requiring” universal 
proxy cards but would not prohibit the SEC from merely permitting a universal 
proxy card.210 
B. Nominee Consent Policies 
The draft Financial CHOICE Act and the change in control of the SEC under 
the Trump Administration have made the future of universal proxies much less 
clear. Even though the opposition to the universal proxy rule is likely misguided, 
it seems unlikely that the SEC Chairman appointed by President Trump, Jay 
Clayton, will pursue a universal proxy rule.211 In the absence of any SEC 
rulemaking, the bona fide nominee rule will remain in effect. 
Even with the bona fide nominee rule in effect, it would be possible for 
universal proxies to be implemented by private ordering on a corporation-by-
corporation basis. Rather than changing the bona fide nominee rule itself, 
corporations could implement a policy whereby all nominees consented to 
inclusion in all proxy statements submitted for the election, what I refer to as a 
“nominee consent policy.” 
Corporations could require that, as a precondition for their nomination as a 
director, the nominee give consent to inclusion in any proxy statement that is 
submitted in connection with the election of directors at the annual meeting at 
which they are nominated. Such language would apply to both management 
nominees and dissident nominees and would permit either management or 
dissidents to use a universal proxy card if they wished.212 A nominee consent 
 
 210.   Id. § 845. 
 211.   Even though SEC action requires a majority vote of Commissioners, because the 
SEC Chairman manages the SEC staff and controls the SEC’s agenda, the Chairman has the power to 
prevent the SEC from taking certain actions. See, e.g., Aulana L. Peters, Independent Agencies: 
Government’s Scourge or Salvation Symposium: The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 286, 288. 
 212.   In two recent proxy contests, management have attempted to construe statements 
in questionnaires that dissident nominees are required to submit to the corporation as consent for the 
dissident nominee to be included on the management proxy card, although one such attempt was 
withdrawn after being challenged by the dissident. See Andrew M. Freedman, Trap for the Unwary 
Shareholder Activist: The Latest Tactic by Companies To Tilt the Playing Field in Proxy Contests, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 6, 2017), 
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policy could be a bylaw of the corporation or even included in the corporation’s 
charter. If a contest arose in which a universal proxy might favor the dissident, 
managers may be tempted to amend the nominee consent policy, which they 
could generally do if the policy were a bylaw of the corporation.213 To forestall 
this possibility, the nominee consent policy provision should either provide that 
it cannot be repealed without a vote of the shareholders of the corporation, or be 
included in the corporation’s charter, which would have the same effect. 
Since a nominee consent policy was first suggested in earlier drafts of this 
Article, at least one company has attempted to adopt a nominee consent policy. 
Mellanox Technologies, Ltd. has proposed amendments to its charter214 that 
would require any shareholders putting forward nominees for election to provide 
the consent of each nominees to be named in any proxy card for the company’s 
next shareholder meeting.215 The charter of the corporation would also require 
each side in a contested election to use a universal proxy card.216 
Without SEC action, nominee consent policies could only be implemented 
on a corporation-by-corporation basis. Directors of corporations could adopt a 
bylaw amendment incorporating the universal proxy consent policy. Directors 
that accept the results presented in Part III showing that a universal proxy card 
could more often favor managers might be incentivized to adopt such nominee 
consent policies. However, there are reasons to believe that directors may not be 
willing to implement these policies unprompted. Managers may prefer to 
maintain the status quo arrangement, either because of uncertainty about the 
likely effects of a universal proxy, or from an aversion to being an early-adopter 
of a universal proxy. Since a nominee consent policy would only have any effect 
on the corporation in the event of a proxy contest, adopting a nominee consent 
policy may be interpreted as implying that directors believe that there is a 
 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/06/trap-for-the-unwary-shareholder-activist-the-latest-tactic-by-
companies-to-tilt-the-playing-field-in-proxy-contests [http://perma.cc/92FJ-VHYT].  
 213.   In most corporations, directors have the power to amend bylaws of the corporation. 
A question might arise whether such amendment would be prohibited as being an unreasonable impedance 
on stockholder voting. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(imposing a heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for actions done with the primary 
purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power). 
 214.   Since Mellanox is an Israeli company, the amendments are to its articles of 
association, which are akin to the certificate of incorporation of a U.S. corporation. See Mellanox 
Technologies, Ltd., supra note 84, at 2. 
 215.   Mellanox Technologies, Ltd., supra note 84, at 14–15 (requiring shareholders 
putting forward nominees to provide “the consent of each nominee to be named as a nominee for election 
as a Director of the Company in any proxy statement or proxy, intermediary instruction form or written 
ballot (each a ‘proxy card’) relating to the Company’s next Annual General Meeting or Extraordinary 
General Meeting at which Directors are to be elected”). 
 216.   Id. at 15 (requiring that, “in the event of a contested election, each proxy card used 
in connection with the election of Directors of the Company . . . shall (A) set forth the names of (I) all 
persons nominated for election by the Board of Directors and (II) all persons with respect to whom a 
written notice of a shareholder’s intent to make a nomination for election as a Director at such meeting 
has been given . . . .”). The amendment would also require that the universal proxy distinguish between 
the management nominees and the dissident nominees and group them as such; to list the nominees in 
alphabetical order within each group; and to use the same font for all nominees. Id. 
 Universal Proxies 
73 
significant likelihood of an activist intervening in the corporation and potentially 
commencing a proxy contest. 
Nominee consent policies could also be initiated by investors. Investors 
could submit a shareholder proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8217 that would request 
that directors implement a nominee consent policy. While such proposals are 
merely precatory and do not require directors to follow the request of 
shareholders, there is considerable pressure on directors to follow successful 
precatory proposals.218 Precatory proposals have led to widespread changes on 
other corporate governance proposals, such as majority voting,219 board 
declassification,220 and proxy access.221 An example of a precatory resolution to 
implement a nominee consent policy is included in the Appendix. 
If precatory proposals proved insufficient, investors could put forward 
bylaw amendment proposals. In the past, some directors have demurred from 
implementing precatory proposals even after they receive significant majorities 
on multiple occasions.222 For other precatory proposals, directors might 
implement a version of the requested policy with details that make it much less 
restrictive, although nominee consent policies are difficult to narrow. If 
successful, bylaw amendment proposals have the advantage of taking effect 
without requiring further action by directors. Bylaw amendment proposals are 
more complicated and therefore costlier to prepare and submit than precatory 
proposals and may receive lower levels of investor support than precatory 
proposals.223 They have therefore rarely been used in the past.224 Bylaw 
amendment proposals would be better submitted in the few cases where directors 
refuse to implement precatory proposals recommending universal proxy consent 
policies. An example of a bylaw amendment resolution to implement a nominee 
consent policy is included in the Appendix. 
 
 217.   17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2017). 
 218.   See Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 239 (2018) 
(discussing the pressure for directors to follow the wishes of a majority of their shareholders). In addition, 
directors not following such proposals are likely to have substantially higher levels of withheld votes at 
subsequent elections, which directors prefer to avoid. See Ertimur et al., supra note 54 (manuscript at 7) 
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voted on within a five-year period). 
Universal Proxies 
74 
Investor-initiated adoption of nominated consent policies would be a 
significantly inferior second-best alternative to SEC rulemaking. Resource 
constraints on the part of many investors and agency costs on the part of others 
are likely to lead to under-initiation of nominee consent policies by investors. 
While such policies would likely be valuable at the great majority of 
corporations, investor initiation would only lead to some limited proportion 
adopting the policy, and it would take considerable time and duplication of effort 
to do so.225 In contrast, SEC regulation has economies of scale: it could change 
the default arrangement for all corporations, all at once. 
Investor-initiated adoption of nominee consent policies would nonetheless 
be valuable, and not just for its effects at particular corporations. Such adoptions 
would signal to the SEC that there was considerable investor support for a change 
from the current proxy rules. In the past, investor-initiated changes to executive 
compensation led to SEC action on the topic. If—or when—a proxy contest took 
place at a corporation that had adopted a nominee consent policy, the outcome 
of the contest would provide further evidence for the effects of universal proxies. 
Conclusion 
Contested director elections are a key feature of the corporate landscape. 
However, the current proxy voting rules can prevent shareholders from choosing 
the mix of nominees that they prefer in a contested election. This Article shows 
that this can lead to distortions in proxy contest outcomes: different directors 
being elected than a plurality of shareholders would prefer. These may be either 
distortions between the two sides in the contest, within sides, or both. 
Universal proxies would allow shareholders to vote for the mix of nominees 
they prefer, and eliminate the possibility of distortions. However, a proposed 
universal proxy regulation has met with significant opposition. Both sides of this 
debate have suffered from a lack of evidence about the extent of distortions and 
the likely effects of a universal proxy rule. 
This Article provides empirical evidence of the extent of distortions and the 
likely effects of a proposed universal proxy regulation that would address the 
problem. The analysis shows that distorted outcomes are a real and practical 
problem. As many as 15% of proxy contests between 2001 and 2016 may have 
had distorted outcomes. Seven percent of proxy contests during that period, and 
10% of contests at large corporations, can be expected to have had distorted 
outcomes. 
This analysis permits further inferences that illuminate the debate over a 
universal proxy rule. Contrary to claims made by opponents of universal proxies, 
there is no evidence that a universal proxy rule would favor dissidents. If 
anything, a universal proxy rule may slightly favor management nominees. 
 
 225.   See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law, 8 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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Because proxy contests are initiated by dissidents, a universal proxy contest is 
unlikely to lead to additional proxy contests. 
The significant incidence of potential distortions within sides suggests that 
a universal proxy rule may result in greater focus on the actual nominees, rather 
than just the sides proposing them. The evidence presented in this Article shows 
that the significant benefits of universal proxies in eliminating distortions would 
outweigh the possible costs foreseen by some commentators, which are unlikely 
to eventuate. 
In contrast to the SEC’s proposed mandatory rule, universal proxies would 
be best implemented as an investor-ordered rule that would set an arrangement 
permitting or requiring universal proxies as a default and permit corporations to 
opt out of the arrangement by a shareholder vote. If the SEC fails to implement 
a universal proxy regulation, a second-best solution is available through private 
ordering. Corporations or investors could initiate bylaw amendments 
implementing nominee consent policies, which would require nominees to 
consent to inclusion on other proxy statements for contested elections. Whether 
implemented by SEC regulation or by private ordering, universal proxy 
arrangements would have important benefits for corporations and investors by 




Appendix: Model Nominee Consent Resolutions 
A. Precatory Nominee Consent Policy Resolution 
RESOLVED, that the shareholders of [Corporation] urge the Board of 
Directors to take all necessary steps to implement a nominee consent policy, 
whereby all nominees for election as directors of the corporation at a meeting of 
shareholders shall be required to consent to their inclusion in any proxy 
statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding election 
of nominees at that meeting of shareholders. 
B. Nominee Consent Policy Bylaw Amendment Resolution 
RESOLVED, that the bylaws of [Corporation] are hereby amended to add 
[Section __] as follows: 
No person may be appointed as a director or nominated for election as a 
director unless that person has submitted to the secretary of the corporation their 
consent, in writing, to their inclusion in any proxy statement filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for the purpose of soliciting proxies for a 
meeting at which the person is a nominee for election as a director. 
